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Chapter 2: The International IP System

Introduction
International intellectual property law has become an integral component of trade
and development policy. Likewise, trade and development concerns now frame
much of the debate occurring within the international intellectual property system.
Although part of the political impetus for international intellectual property
law making has long come from the economic gains that particular countries
could secure in the global market, the recent situation of intellectual property
within the institutional apparatus of the trade regime has been an important
factor in the transformation of the classical system of international intellectual
property law.
This chapter analyses various aspects of this transformation, and suggests that
viewing intellectual property through the prism of trade alone offers an incomplete
explanation of the changes that have occurred in international intellectual property
law making. Rather, it is the particular character of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and the dominant theoretical justification for contemporary trade policy
(the theory of comparative advantage) that have magnified the transformative
force of the shift to the trade regime. And, a full account of the contemporary
system must reflect the role of both litigation in national courts and private
ordering by commercial actors in establishing international intellectual property
norms. This chapter stresses that these new contributors to the international
system must be subject to no lesser scrutiny than traditional public international
instruments such as treaties. Scholars should review national court decisions and
private ordering for their effect on the balance of rights between owners and users
of intellectual property. Moreover, such scrutiny must include an assessment of
whether these new forms of law making take into account the appropriate
allocation of regulation between national and international institutions.
Part I of this chapter describes the classical architecture of the international
intellectual property system, and the basic conceptual and institutional pillars
on which that system was built. In particular, I emphasize that the classical
system formed around treaties concluded by nation states and effectively preserved substantial autonomy for states crafting domestic intellectual property
policy. The system recognized that the promulgation of international norms
affected not only the balance of rights between owners and users but also the
balance of national and international regulation, the latter balance being a concern of public international law generally.
Part II discusses some of the ways in which that system is changing. For example,
there is increasing pressure to find international solutions to intellectual property
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Introduction
policy dilemmas without the period of domestic experimentation with alternative models that was emblematic of the classical system. This contemporary
approach has costs. To ameliorate the costs associated with the speedy development of international rules, and perhaps to ensure that some international solution is adopted, policy makers have begun more overtly to support the adoption
of soft law norms rather than hard law treaty obligations. In response, those sceptical of these trends in international intellectual property law making have sought
to slow down the process or bring it to a complete halt. In order to achieve a
political climate where public international law imposes fewer constraints on
national law makers (particularly law makers in developing countries), sceptics
have adopted a number of strategies, including the multiplication of international institutions in which intellectual property is considered, and the concomitant development of a range of rival norms that have massively complicated the
political economy of public international intellectual property law.
Using examples drawn primarily from copyright and trademark law, I illustrate
the pressure to accelerate internationalization, the varying strength of adopted
norms, and the changes to the political climate in which public international law
making is occurring. To some extent, these changes reflect increased political and
popular attention to trade and development. However, regardless of the catalyst,
these systemic changes remain crucially important to trade and development
because of the entanglement of intellectual property with trade and development
policy.
Part III focuses, in greater detail, on two further changes in the international
intellectual property system, namely, the increased role of both national courts
and private ordering in developing international norms. In the classical international intellectual property system, national courts played a relatively limited role
in developing, interpreting or implementing international norms. However, in
recent years national courts have become more involved in the construction of
international intellectual property law. Part III.A discusses both those judicial
developments and pending projects that might further enhance the emerging
role of national courts in the development of the system of international intellectual property law. For some time, these projects included the development of a
treaty addressing transborder intellectual property disputes. Thus, the draft
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters (the ‘Draft Hague Convention’),1 a proposed general treaty

1 See ‘Hague Conference on Private International Law, Summary of the Outcome of Discussions’
in Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference, 6–20 June, 2001, reprinted in
(2002) 77 Chi–Kent LR 1015. The (June 2001) version of the ‘Draft Hague Convention’ is referred
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Chapter 2: The International IP System
addressing multinational civil and commercial litigation, included important
provisions addressing intellectual property. Similar (and in many respects more
ambitious) efforts were undertaken in a more academic setting by Professors
Rochelle Dreyfuss and Jane Ginsburg, who authored a Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters (the
‘Dreyfuss–Ginsburg proposal’).2 However, the consensus necessary to adopt a
treaty, either with respect to civil litigation generally or dedicated to intellectual
property disputes, never emerged. The Hague proposal was substantially narrowed, resulting ultimately in the conclusion of a convention validating exclusive
choice of court clauses in business to business contracts. The Dreyfuss–Ginsburg
proposal, however, was embraced by the American Law Institute as the basis for
the development of a soft law instrument entitled ‘Intellectual Property: Principles
Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational Disputes’
(‘ALI Principles’). After several revisions, that document was adopted by the
membership of the American Law Institute at its annual meeting in San Francisco
in May 2007.
The role of national courts in the development of international intellectual property law is not going to diminish. National court decisions may of themselves
construct (or at least contribute to) international intellectual property law through
the sheer fact of their geographical reach; and this contribution may occur
whether effectuated through the ad hoc application and extension of existing
doctrinal devices by national courts, or through the development and application
of a treaty under which such developments are consciously encouraged or appropriately limited.3 In Part III.A of this chapter, I sketch a vision of the contemporary international intellectual property system that accommodates (and actively
seeks to incorporate) national judicial activity, and I situate the different proposals within that environment.
In Part III.B, I analyse another change to the classical model. Consistent perhaps
with an evolution in international law generally, international intellectual property

to where necessary as the ‘June 2001’ draft Hague Convention in order to distinguish this text from
the draft proposal published in October 1999. See ‘Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters’ (adopted 30 October 1999), available at
<http://www.hcch.net>.
2 Rochelle C Dreyfuss and Jane C Ginsburg, ‘Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition
of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters’ (2002) 77 Chi–Kent LR 1065.
3 Indeed, those critics who wish to reserve intellectual property issues to the control of local
courts might wish to ensure that any treaty governing transborder civil litigation includes a broad
exclusive jurisdiction provision rather than (as many do) advocating that intellectual property be
wholly excluded from the scope of any such convention.
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Introduction
norms are increasingly established and developed through private ordering.4
In this chapter, I focus on two examples of international copyright norm formation that would fall outside a classical understanding of international intellectual
property law: (1) norms generated by the commercial practices of information
intermediaries, internet service providers (ISPs) in responding to claims of alleged
copyright infringement by their subscribers, and (2) norms arising from digital
rights management systems (DRMs) employed by copyright owners to limit the
ability of users of copyrighted works to engage in activity previously authorized
by public copyright laws (e.g. fair use copying, or private copying where permitted
by national legislation). While conventional international copyright law has left
much law making in these areas to national law, in both contexts, international
norms may be evolving with insufficient public scrutiny (as regards both substantive rules and structural allocation of norm making between national and international levels). Particularly in the online context, private ordering has been
hailed by some as an elixir to cure the inefficiencies of the offline world and to
enhance the political legitimacy of governing rules and institutions. Yet, although
private ordering has largely been validated in several areas of intellectual property
law, its efficiency and legitimacy has been questioned in several domestic contexts,
and the same questioning will (and should) occur in the context of international
copyright law.
Moreover, as in the domestic context, the legitimacy and success of private ordering
will depend upon the legal underpinning of these nominally private transactions.
These legal underpinnings, what I have called the public structuring of private
ordering, provide the points at which public values can most easily inform and
shape the regulation that private ordering effects.5 Moreover, as copyright owners
over-reach, or imbalances favouring copyright owners arise, political pressure
will increase to subject private ordering to greater public oversight. The two
examples I discuss illustrate some of the possible mixes of private ordering and
public structuring that we might consider. No single combination of private
ordering and public regulation will be appropriate in all cases. However, to the
extent that private ordering is effecting the creation of international copyright

4 For a discussion of the different meanings of ‘private ordering’, see Niva Elkin-Koren,
‘Copyrights in Cyberspace—Rights Without Laws?’ (1998) 73 Chi–Kent LR 1155, 1160.
5 Justification for the elevation of public values may lie in the realist critique that public and private is an illusory divide. But it is at these points, where there is incontrovertible public structuring
of the environment in which private ordering occurs, that the claim is easiest to sustain. The efficiency and the legitimacy of private ordering, and thus its ability to contribute to the development
of international copyright norms, are intertwined with the public structuring.
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Chapter 2: The International IP System
norms, public regulation must also be constructed with an eye to the issues and
basic premises of international copyright law.6

Part I The Classical System of International Intellectual
Property Law
A. Public International Law
The beginnings of a developed system of international intellectual property law
can be traced back to the 1880s, with the conclusion by nation states of the Paris7
and Berne Conventions.8 These treaties were built around two basic propositions.9 First, signatory states had to provide in their domestic law certain minimum levels of intellectual property protection that met so-called substantive
minima found in the international agreements. Second, as a general rule, signatory states were obliged to offer to nationals of other signatory states protection
which matched that afforded to their own nationals. This is the principle of
national treatment.10
This basic structure—national treatment plus substantive minima—persisted
throughout the twentieth century. Although the substantive minima obligations

6 The use of norms developed through DRMs might fit more easily within most notions of private ordering than norms developed through the practices of ISPs. The specific nature of ISP normgenerating practice is ‘incentivized’ by legislation that grants immunity in advance to certain
practices; the ability of DRM systems to create copyright-inconsistent norms is ensured by legislation that, in response to the onset of DRMs, generally immunized the private acts of the content
owner from being overridden by public values enshrined in the copyright law without reference to
the content of any particular digital rights management. But both raise the question of the extent to
which, and means by which, norms generated through the practices of private actors and enforced
by contract and technology should be subject to ongoing supervision in order to ensure that in certain circumstances publicly developed norms trump inconsistent privately generated arrangements.
So I treat them together in this chapter. Indeed, the ambiguities of the term merely highlight its truly
mythical nature. See Margaret J Radin and Robert P Wagner, ‘The Myth of Private Ordering:
Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace’ (1998) 73 Chi–Kent LR 1295.
7 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 20 March 1883, as last revised at
Stockholm, 14 July 1967, Art 28, 21 UST 1583, 828 UNTS 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
8 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971 Paris text), 24 July
1971, 1161 UNTS 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; see generally Sam Ricketson and Jane C
Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond (Oxford
University Press, 2006). The first version of the Berne Convention was concluded in 1886.
9 The Paris Convention also contained provisions designed to facilitate the acquisition of national
registered rights on a multinational basis. See note 7 above, Art 4.
10 See Paris Convention, note 7 above, Art 2; Berne Convention, note 8 above, Art 5.
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A. Public International Law
were periodically revised to require greater and different protection, the conceptual approach has endured. Indeed, it remains the dominant approach in
current intellectual property treaties.11 Some essential characteristics of this
system are worth noting. In particular, this approach only barely intruded
upon the national sovereignty of signatory states. It left states with substantial
latitude in crafting their domestic laws. Different countries, situated in different
social and economic conditions, might optimize the production of knowledge
through different calibration of various doctrinal devices of national intellectual
property law.
This latitude was achieved through several features. First, the substantive
minima were initially quite undemanding.12 They were in most cases meant to
reflect a consensus position, as codifications of existing state practice.13 Second,
many central concepts (such as who is an ‘author’ of a copyrighted work) were
left open for signatory states to develop in accordance with their own national
policies and values. And, this latitude was affirmed in practical terms by the fact
that the obligations undertaken by states were not backed up with effective
enforcement mechanisms. Although in later revisions of the Berne and Paris
Conventions provision was made to refer disputes between states regarding the
meaning of those conventions to the International Court of Justice,14 this was
never done.15
The international intellectual property system need not have developed in this
manner. In the debates leading up to the adoption of the Berne Convention,
some delegations advanced the alternative notion of a universal copyright law.
But these attempts were defeated by the pragmatic demands of greater national

11 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994
[hereinafter the TRIPs Agreement or TRIPs], Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, Legal Instruments–Results of the Uruguay
Round, Vol 31, 33 ILM 81 (1994).
12 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, ‘A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create
Global Norms’ (2000) 149 U Pa LR 469, 491 (discussing the Berne Convention and describing initial standards as ‘hardly exacting’); Graeme B. Dinwoodie et al, ‘International Intellectual Property
Law and Policy 140’ (Lexis–Nexis, 2001) (describing trademark-related obligations in the Paris
Convention as ‘relatively low-level’); Joanna Schmidt-Szalewski, ‘The International Protection of
Trademarks After the TRIPs Agreement’ (1998) 9 Duke J Comp & Int’l L 189, 199–201 (discussing
the ‘few trademark rules’ provided by the Paris Convention).
13 See Dinwoodie, ‘A New Copyright Order’, note 12 above, 493 (noting that the traditional
Berne Convention revisions ‘constituted the received wisdom of the participating countries rather
than prospective solutions to new problems’).
14 See Berne Convention, note 8 above, Art 33; Paris Convention, note 7 above, Art 28.
15 See Jerome H Reichman, ‘Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures of the TRIPs Agreement’
(1997) 37 Va J Int’l L 335, 339 n.17.
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Chapter 2: The International IP System
control over the course of copyright law.16 Similar tensions, though less starkly
presented, can be found in the development of the Paris Convention.17 International intellectual property norms were to be developed and enforced with
important regard for the autonomy of nation states.

B. Private International Law
In this scheme, national courts had very little role to play in the construction
of international intellectual property law. Public international standards in
the treaties found their way into national law largely through legislative implementation in domestic law.18 This was particularly true in the United States
(where many, if not all, of the primary intellectual property treaties are not selfexecuting).19 The treaties did not, in any event, contain a comprehensive
code that could substitute for general domestic legislation. National courts thus
interpreted local intellectual property law, even if the content of that law had, in
part, been influenced by international obligations.20
Moreover, the causes of action which courts were called upon to adjudicate
principally involved national rights. Even if international intellectual property
treaties were self-executing, intellectual property rights remained national in
scope. Territoriality of rights is a fundamental premise of classical international

16 See Jane C Ginsburg, ‘The Role of National Copyright in an Era of International Copyright
Norms’, in Adolf Deitz (ed), The Role of National Legislation in Copyright Law (ALAI, 2000),
211, 213.
17 See Crocker Nat’l Bank v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 223 USPQ 909, 918–21
(TTAB en banc 1984) (discussing negotiation of Art 6 of the Paris Convention); United States–
Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS176/AB/R
(WTO 2 January 2002) [hereinafter United States–Section 211], (noting the legislative discretion
retained by national governments under the Paris Convention), available at <http://www.world
tradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/us-section211(ab).pdf> (last visited 7 June 2002).
18 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, ‘The Development and Incorporation of International Norms in
the Formation of Copyright Law’ (2001) 62 Ohio St LJ 733, 739 (discussing copyright law).
19 See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub L No 100–568, §2, 102 Stat 2853
(Berne Convention not self-executing); Mannington Mills, Inc v Congoleum Corp, 595 F2d 1287,
1299 (3d Cir 1979) (treating the Paris Convention as not self-executing); see also Vanity Fair Mills,
Inc v T Eaton Co, 234 F2d 633, 640–44 (2d Cir 1956) (suggesting that the Paris Convention is selfexecuting, but finding no enlargement of substantive rights under US trademark law). But see
Laboratorios Roldan v Tex Int’l, Inc, 902 F Supp 1555, 1568 (SD Fla, 1995) (recognizing claim under
Art 10bis of the Paris Convention).
20 To the extent that domestic law was understood as implementation of international obligations, national courts would typically interpret any ambiguity in the domestic rule in accordance
with the international norm. But this is only a canon of interpretation. The reference to the underlying international norm depended upon the existence of an ambiguity in the domestic provision. See
In re Rath, 402 F3d 1207 (Fed Cir 2005).
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B. Private International Law
intellectual property law. There is no such thing as a global copyright or trademark,
or global patent, with a unitary set of rights conferred and governed by a single,
substantive international law.21 The creation of a fixed, original work of authorship,
for example, gives rise to separate national copyrights in all countries affording
copyright protection according to the different national laws of each of those
countries.
Finally, the disputes that confronted courts were largely national in nature.
National courts did, of course, have some occasion to address issues of private
international law where cross-border effects occurred.22 But such events were
rarer than today. And matters of private international law were left largely
untouched by the intellectual property conventions.23
Indeed, in the United States, courts generally have substantial discretion regarding
the rules of private international law (such as jurisdiction to adjudicate, choice
of law or applicable law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments).24
Domestically, the United States Constitution, at least as interpreted, imposes
greater restraints on the exercise by courts of personal jurisdiction than on the
assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction (i.e. the Constitution contributes to the
rules of personal jurisdiction but leaves choice of law rules largely unregulated).25
And although recognition of foreign judgments is the norm in US law, this
flows neither from constitutional mandate—the Full Faith and Credit Clause

See Dinwoodie et al, note 12 above, 1.
See, e.g. Vanity Fair Mills, note 19 above, 641 (US–Canadian trademark infringement);
Sheldon v Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp, 106 F2d 45, 52 (2d Cir 1939) (awarding plaintiff profits
from both US and Canadian exhibition of infringing motion picture where a copy of the motion
picture had been made in the United States and then shipped to Canada for exhibition), aff ’d, 309
US 390 (1940).
23 See Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v Russian Kurier, Inc, 153 F3d 82, 90–91 (2d Cir 1998)
(noting lack of guidance regarding choice of law issues in the Berne Convention); Jane C. Ginsburg,
‘Private International Law Aspects of the Protection of Works and Objects of Related Rights
Transmitted Through Digital Networks’, WIPO Doc GCPIC/2, 22 and 34 (30 November 1998)
(discussing the extent to which the Berne Convention determines the law applicable to issues of
copyright ownership and infringement), at <http://www.wipo.int/eng/meetings/1998/gcpic/pdf/
gcpic_2.pdf> (last visited 7 June 2002); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, ‘Private International Aspects of the
Protection of Trademarks’ (January 2001) WIPO Doc No WIPO/PIL/01/4, ¶ 14 (discussing the
minimal influence of international trademark treaties on choice of law), available at <http://www.
wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_pil_01/wipo_pil_01_4.doc> (last visited 11 May 2007);
see also Fritz Blumer, ‘Patent Law and International Private Law on Both Sides of the Atlantic’
(January 2001) WIPO Doc No WIPO/PIL/01/3, ¶ 2.1 (discussing how far the territoriality principle affects matters of private international law in patent cases), available at <http://www.wipo.int/
edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_pil_01/wipo_pil_01_3.doc> (last visited 11 May 2007).
24 See Eugene F. Scoles et al, Conflict of Laws 2, 3d ed, (West Publishing, 2000).
25 Compare Allstate Insurance Co v Hague, 449 US 302, 308 (1981) (choice of law) with Asahi
Metal Indus Co v Superior Court, 480 US 102, 113 (1987) (personal jurisdiction).
21
22
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does not extend to the international context26—nor from any international
treaty obligations assumed by the United States.27
Of course, some private international law rules developed from those international intellectual property disputes that did arise.28 Flowing from the premise
that all rights were national, and from the mindset that regarded intellectual
property laws as public in nature, courts were reluctant to adjudicate disputes
involving foreign intellectual property rights. Thus, although there is an important
difference between having jurisdiction to adjudicate a case and the choice
of law or law applicable to the case, courts—both in the United States and
elsewhere—would decline to hear a case if their own law was not being applied.29
The question of applicable law drove the exercise of power to adjudicate.30
As a consequence, where infringement did occur in several states, suits
typically had to be filed in separate national courts seeking relief for each
national infringement.31 Determining the applicable law was thought to be
quite easy: where did the reproduction, the use, the publication, or the sale

See US Constitution Art IV, § 1.
See Hilton v Guyot, 159 US 113, 163–64 (1895) (resting recognition of foreign judgments
on comity); SARL Louis Feraud Intern v Viewfinder Inc, 406 F Supp 2d 274 (SDNY 2005) rev’d
F3d, 2007 WL 1598057 (2d Cir June 5, 2007). For a recent indication by the Canadian Supreme
Court that internationalization of the exploitation of intellectual property requires reconsideration
of traditional principles of recognition of judgments, see Pro Swing Inc v ELTA Golf Inc, 2006
Carswell Ont 7203; 2006 SCC 52 (2006).
28 See note 22 above (listing illustrative cases); see also Steele v Bulova Watch Co, 344 US 280,
283–84 (1952) (extraterritorial application of Lanham Act to activities in Mexico with effects on US
commerce); Robert Stigwood Group Ltd v O’Reilly, 530 F2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir 1976) (declining to
apply US copyright law extraterritorially to performances in Canada).
29 See, e.g. Vanity Fair Mills, note 19 above (trademark); ITSI TV Prods, Inc v Cal Auth of Racing
Fairs Agric, 785 F Supp 854, 866 (ED Cal 1992) (copyright), rev’d on other grounds, 3 F3d 1289
(9th Cir 1993); see also Deepsouth Packing Co v Laitram Corp, 406 US 518, 537 (1972) (suggesting
that a US patent holder seeking protection in foreign markets should avail itself of its foreign patents);
Rectifier Corp v Samsung Elecs, 361 F3d 1355 (Fed Cir 2004)
30 In practice, the cause and effect of this relationship might not have been so clear. That is, one
could interpret judicial practice as reflecting the sentiment that, if the court found jurisdiction to
adjudicate, it applied its own law.
31 This remains the norm. See Computer Assocs Int’l, Inc v Altai, Inc, 126 F3d 365, 371–72 (2d Cir
1997) (refusing to grant antisuit injunction against pursuit of French copyright infringement action
notwithstanding that the defendant’s program had been held to be non-infringing in parallel US
proceedings between the same parties involving the same works); Microsoft Corp v Lindows.com, Inc,
319 F Supp 2d 1219 (WD Wash 2004) (trademark). Compare Euromarket Designs, Inc v Crate &
Barrel Ltd, 96 F Supp 2d 824 (ND Ill 2000) (discussing claim for infringement of US trademark
rights in mark ‘Crate & Barrel’) with Euromarket Designs, Inc v Peters, [2000] ETMR 1025 (Ch 2000)
(England) (claim for infringement of UK trademark rights in same mark); compare Improver Corp
and Sicommerce v Remington Prods, 24 IIC 838 (Dusseldorf Ct. App. 1991) (FRG) (discussing action
in Germany for infringement of patent on Epilady shaver) with Improver Corp and Others v Remington
Consumer Prods Ltd, 1990 FSR 181 (High Court 1989) (UK) (action in the UK for infringement of
patent on same invention).
26
27
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B. Private International Law
occur? The place of such acts would be the place of infringement.32 The law
of this place would thus be the applicable law, which meant that this would
be where the plaintiff sued and where enforcement occurred. So, complex
multinational intellectual property litigation appears in practice to have
been quite rare.
National courts thus had little trouble with, and did not readily develop, rules of
private international law for intellectual property disputes. And, they had very
little engagement with the rules of public international intellectual property
found in treaties, because these were not the source of the rules of decision in the
cases before them. There was, therefore, very little dynamic between public and
private international intellectual property laws.

Part II Changes to the Classical System
Over the last 15 to 20 years we have witnessed some changes to the foregoing description of the international intellectual property system. However,
some things have not altered. The prevailing doctrinal premise is still one
of territoriality;33 rights remain largely national in nature;34 and the principal

32 Trademark law is, to some extent, concerned more with effects (e.g. consumer confusion). Thus,
although some courts and scholars have sought to elevate the nature of the defendant’s use in assessing
whether an act amounts to infringement, localization of trademark infringing activity will often turn
on where consumers are alleged to have been confused. See World Intellectual Property Organization,
‘Joint Recommendation Concerning the Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial Property Rights
in Signs, on the internet’ (October 2001), available at <http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/
govbody/wo_gb_ab/pdf/a36_8.pdf> (last visited 11 May 2007) (defining the location of use online
by reference to commercial effect).
33 See Computer Associates, note 31 above, 365 (copyright); Rotec Indus, Inc v Mitsubishi Corp,
215 F3d 1246, 1251 (Fed Cir 2000) (requiring that in order to violate the patent holder’s exclusive
right to offer its patented invention for sale, the allegedly infringing offer must occur within the
United States); Johns Hopkins Univ v Cellpro, Inc, 152 F3d 1342 (Fed Cir 1998) (patent); Sterling
Drug, Inc v Bayer AG, 14 F3d 733, 736, 744–48 (2d Cir 1994) (taking territorial nature of trademark rights into account when fashioning relief ); Subafilms, Ltd v MGM-Pathé Communications Co,
24 F3d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir 1994) (copyright); Person’s Co Ltd v Christman, 900 F2d 1565, 1569
n18 (Fed Cir 1990) (declining to revise territorial understanding to reflect the ‘world economy’);
Playboy Enters v Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc, 939 F Supp 1032, 1036–37 (SDNY 1996) (taking territorial
nature of trademark rights into account when fashioning relief ).
34 Even those exceptional modifications of national rights that exist, such as unitary trademark
rights over the entire region of several nations within a free trade agreement (most notably, the
European Union: see Council Regulation 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on The Community Trademark,
1994 OJ (L 11), available at: <http://oami.europa.eu/en/mark/aspects/pdf/4094enCV.pdf> (last visited 11 May 2007)), could plausibly still be regarded as territorial in nature, albeit with a territory
now defined by the regional ‘superstate’ rather than individual nation states.
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intellectual property agreements remain structured around the dual principles
of national treatment and substantive minima.35
But in that time, our social and economic environment has become more global
in nature. Intellectual property products, like their creators and users, move
through international commerce and international communities with speed and
in quantities that we could not previously have imagined. This has prompted
demands for intellectual property laws that are more global in reach, and the
sometimes inconsistent demand for intellectual property laws that respond more
quickly to new problems and new technologies.36 In this climate, the principles
of territoriality and national autonomy over intellectual property policy have
come under pressure. In this Part, I will briefly highlight some of the most
important changes to the public international intellectual property system, the
network of obligations among nation states.

A. Lessons from Copyright
Intersecting Vectors of Balance
One of the dominant justifications tendered for the existence of copyright protection is that it encourages the generation and distribution of knowledge.37
Copyright can be and is supported on other grounds (especially outside common
law countries).38 And the precise dynamic by which copyright effectuates
its knowledge-positive purpose is unclear: different groups of producers and
distributors no doubt respond to a different balance of incentives, and the
inter-relationship between incentives to produce and incentives to distribute
is complex. But the incentive theory is given substantial weight in most countries
throughout the world.39 If, as conventional theory suggests, a certain level of
copyright protection enhances the supply of knowledge then, it might be argued,

35 See TRIPs Agreement, note 11 above, Art 2(1) (requiring compliance with stated provisions of
the Paris Convention), Art 3 (national treatment), and Art 9(1) (requiring compliance with stated
provisions of the Berne Convention); see also United States–Section 211, note 17 above (discussing
national treatment obligations of TRIPs), at <http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/
us-section211(ab).pdf> (last visited 7 June 2002).
36 See Dinwoodie, ‘A New Copyright Order’, note 12 above, 477 (discussing these pressures in
copyright law).
37 See Mazer v Stein, 347 US 201, 219 (1954); William M Landes & Richard A Posner, ‘An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’ (1989) 18 J Leg Stud 325.
38 Stephen M. Stewart, International Copyright and Neighboring Rights, 2nd ed (Lexis Law
Publishers 1989) (discussing justifications grounded in cultural diversity and natural rights); Paul
Goldstein, International Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice (Oxford University Press, 2001).
39 World Intellectual Property Organization, ‘Intellectual Property on the Internet: A Survey of
the Issues,’ (December 2002) WIPO Doc. No. WIPO/INT/02.
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extending this beneficent force to other countries through the development of
an international copyright system will, inter alia, enhance the global store of
knowledge.40 In this sense, international copyright law might be understood as a
mere spatial extension of the conventional instrumentalist proposition.41
Of course, even within single countries, the incentive argument can be pressed
too simplistically. Intricate balancing of competing considerations is necessary
to ensure that copyright does not undermine the public objectives that it purports to advance. More incentive does not necessarily mean more production
and distribution of knowledge. In some instances, gaps in protection lead not
only to a reduced incentive but also to enhanced opportunities for creation and
distribution. The argument for copyright protection relies on the increase in
knowledge from enhanced incentive not being outweighed by a reduction in
knowledge supply that would otherwise occur through gaps in protection.
Those institutions that develop international copyright rules must, no less
than national law makers, pursue the same elusive goal of substantive balance.
International copyright law must likewise be based on an assessment of what
types and levels of protection best further the purposes of copyright law. Thus,
in shaping treaties, policy makers consider the access/incentive dynamic in
ways not unfamiliar in the domestic copyright context. Indeed, they may do
so in a manner far too similar to that which occurs at the domestic level.42
But constructing the international copyright regime is doubly difficult. The
international system must wrestle not only with the copyright dilemmas
confronted on the national level but also with broader questions of balance
that pervade international relations generally.43 In particular, what is the appropriate balance between universal rules and national autonomy? Every international instrument and institution implicitly addresses the competing claims of
universality and national autonomy (or sovereignty). Emphasizing the autonomy

40 In Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 US 186 (2003), the United States Supreme Court suggested that
Congress could rationally view the development of the international copyright system, and the fullest
US participation therein, as a factor that could result in greater incentive for the creation and dissemination of works in the United States. This argument rests on more systemic concerns, namely,
that anything that facilitates a more secure environment for the distribution of authors’ work (which,
in a digital era where works cross borders with ease, includes protection abroad) will encourage the
generation and distribution of works. See Shira Perlmutter, ‘Participation in the International
Copyright System as a Means to Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts’ (2002) 36 Loyola
LA LR 323, 323–325.
41 Historically, adherents to natural rights theories of copyright could use the universalist character
of natural rights to support international copyright laws.
42 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, ‘The WIPO Copyright Treaty: A Transition to the Future of
International Copyright Lawmaking’ (forthcoming, 2007) Case Wes Res Univ LR.
43 Moreover, the notion of balance can be seen as even more complex; identifying two vectors is
itself a vast over-simplification. See ibid.
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of nation states in international copyright law ensured that states could
tailor national laws to their own social, cultural and economic demands. The
incentives likely to maximize the generation and distribution of knowledge
may vary widely from country to country. And, it allowed countries to serve
as laboratories in which to determine whether certain norms were superior to
others as determinants of knowledge supply.44 Discussion of international copyright policy thus extends not only to substantive norms of copyright law, but also
to whether certain norms should be allowed to evolve differently at the national
level in lieu of articulating an international rule.45
Moreover, once a decision is made to develop an international norm, and thus
limit the capacity of nation states to make fully autonomous determinations
regarding the optimal level and form of intellectual property protection, what
will that norm be? How fully will it constrain national choice? Can one construct
an international rule that, by providing some room for cultural and economic
difference, maximizes social utility in different countries?
Over the past century, the international intellectual property system sought
to pursue the commonly-held objectives of copyright law while recognizing that
the values of diversity and self-determination might caution against moving
too quickly in the direction of universal norms.46 The principle of national
treatment, in tandem with the Berne Convention’s substantive minima, ensured
the availability of basic copyright protection for foreign works and foreign
authors in a signatory country. Under conventional theory, it would also enhance
the access to works in the new country by encouraging foreign authors to expand
their distribution to that country.47 Moreover, the availability of property rights
consistent with minimum substantive norms would encourage local production
of knowledge in the country newly acceding to the copyright regime.48 Taken
together, global production of, and access to, creative works, is enhanced by

44 Graeme W. Austin, ‘Valuing “Domestic Self-Determination” in International Intellectual
Property Jurisprudence’ (2002) 77 Chi–Kent LR 1155, 1194–1195; Dinwoodie, ‘A New Copyright
Order’, note 12 above, 503.
45 Those who see copyright as a natural right might be expected to argue for intrusive international norms with strong binding effect. Those who view copyright in more instrumental terms
would likely prefer an approach that allowed each country, pursuing the same general objectives, to
develop policies closely tied to a country’s own social and economic conditions.
46 See Austin, note 44 above, 1172.
47 Moreover, the opening of new, secure markets in turn might enhance the incentive offered
to authors in all countries, further enhancing the global incentive to creation. See Peter M Gerhart,
‘Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory—TRIPS as a Substantive Issue’ (2000) 32 Case W Res J
Int’l L 357.
48 Arguments for international copyright protection are thus strengthened by measures designed
to ensure an indigenous economy that takes advantage of the enhanced incentive. With respect to
developing countries in particular, that calculation may be contingent on variables (e.g. disposable
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the availability of protection internationally.49 But these basic (and internationally shared) copyright objectives could be achieved without the imposition
of universal copyright norms, optimizing overall access to creative works by
allowing for nation-by-nation adjustment, and taking advantage of initial
periods of national experimentation.
The Pressure to Internationalize Promptly
These, then, were the structural or institutional norms that guided the development of international copyright law. In recent years, however, these norms have
been subjected to intense pressure to change. In particular, copyright owners
have sought the adoption of more intrusive international rules, earlier in the
stage of norm development and with respect to a larger array of copyright
issues.50 Thus, in 1996 the European Union and the United States advanced
a proposal for an international treaty mandating a new form of protection for
databases, notwithstanding that the EU Database Directive was of relatively
recent vintage and the US Congress was baulking (and continues to baulk)
at domestic adoption of such a system.51 Debate about the appropriate level
and form of protection for electronic databases was occurring in a number of
countries but an immediate international consensus looked unlikely.
Although the Database Treaty was effectively shelved at the 1996 Geneva
Diplomatic Conference, that conference did adopt two other treaties, namely,
the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty. These so-called ‘Internet Treaties’ sought to retrofit copyright and neighbouring rights for the digital era, a task upon which national policy makers were
only just embarking. Indeed, while the classical international system typically
worked with the raw data of enacted and interpreted national laws, in 1996 negotiators of the Internet Treaties drew inspiration from several pieces of proposed
legislation that were contemporaneously being considered at the national level.52

income, skills and investment necessary to develop indigenous industry) that differ substantially from
country to country and that are not in any event within the exclusive control of copyright law.
49 The conventional argument prevails on the theory that authorized versions of works are likely
in the long term to be more numerous (or more reliably available) than the number of pirate copies
that would be available in the second country in a copyright-free environment. The accuracy of this
premise may vary between countries, differ as between different types of works, and be rendered
quite unstable by the advent of digital communication technologies (especially as these technologies
proliferate in lesser-developed countries).
50 Dinwoodie, ‘A New Copyright Order’, note 12 above, 477–483; Dinwoodie, ‘The WIPO
Copyright Treaty’, note 42 above.
51 See Daniel J Gervais, ‘The Protection of Databases’ (forthcoming, 2007) 82 Chi–Kent LR.
52 WIPO Copyright Treaty, WIPO Doc CRNR/DC/94, 20 December 1996, 36 ILM 65; WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 20 December 1996, 36 ILM 76. See Dinwoodie, ‘The
WIPO Copyright Treaty’, note 42 above.
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More recently, the WIPO Standing Committee on Copyright and Related
Rights (the SCCR) has been moving towards a broadcasting treaty that might
create international rules on webcasting at a time when the market and technological significance of webcasting remains uncertain.
Of course, there may be good reasons to seek international solutions in a speedier
fashion than in the late nineteenth century. In the digital world of instantaneous
global exploitation and easy, faithful reproduction, universal rules are seen as
more efficient and necessary to ensure the effectiveness of domestic policy
choices. The level of effective enforcement of intellectual property rights might
plausibly be figured into the balance of creator and user rights that default
rules of copyright law strive to strike. If so, the ease with which offshore infringing activity can undermine the incentives established by national law is in fact a
matter of distinct local concern.
As discussed below, the argument for early development of international norms
has also been sustained by invocation of contemporary trade theories, which
have assumed greater prominence because of the incorporation of intellectual
property within the broader trade apparatus. In addition, rising resistance to
certain copyright policies in the domestic political arena may have persuaded
proponents of particular measures strategically to shift institutional focus to
the international stage (where, to their dismay and surprise, the same competing
forces are now arrayed).53
The Trade Prism
These arguments, in favour of more rapid and intrusive international copyright
law making, have been assisted by viewing intellectual property through the
prism of international trade. International intellectual property policy making
has, in large part, been subsumed within the broader apparatus of trade relations.
This first occurred unilaterally in the form of annual reviews by the United States
Trade Representative under the Special 301 provisions of the Trade Act54 and the
(more recent) equivalent procedure in the European Union under the Trade
Barriers Regulation.55 A parallel shift was effected multilaterally, in 1994, by the

53 See Pamela Samuelson, ‘The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO’ (1997) 37 Va J Intl’l L 369;
Dinwoodie, ‘The WIPO Copyright Treaty’, note 42 above.
54 See, e.g. Office of The United States Trade Representative, ‘2002 Special 301 Report’ (April 2002),
available at <http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2002/2002_Special_
301_Report/Section_Index.html>; see generally Kim Newby, ‘The Effectiveness of Special 301 in
Creating Long-Term Copyright Protection for US Companies Overseas’ (1995) 21 Syracuse J Int’l L &
Com 29.
55 See Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 of 22 December 1994 (laying down Community
procedures in the field of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the
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inclusion of intellectual property provisions (i.e. TRIPs) within the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization.56 The precise ways in which this
overarching trade context may transform international intellectual property law
remain unclear, but that context surely has altered the character of international
intellectual property relations.57
Most obviously, many of the public international obligations undertaken
by states in the classical era (and some added by TRIPS itself in 1994) are
now backed by an effective dispute settlement system (that of the WTO)
among states to ensure compliance with the internationally agreed-upon
standards.58 International intellectual property law now has real teeth. The
latitude for member state autonomy has been reduced, in both the formation
and interpretation of international norms, though it undoubtedly remains too
early to make final judgments on the effect of the WTO system on international
copyright law.
Nine WTO dispute settlement panel reports addressing TRIPs violations, including one that was copyright-specific, have been handed down thus far (three of
which also gave rise to reports by the Appellate Body). Although all, bar one, find
some transgression of the TRIPs Agreement, these proceedings probably involve
the clearest cases of TRIPs non-compliance. Nor should we draw too much significance from the outcomes of these proceedings alone.59 Indeed, the methodology of panels has been quite strict in tying decisions to the literal language of the
TRIPs Agreement; Webster’s Dictionary has become an essential research tool in

Community’s rights under international trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, 1994 OJ (L 349) 71, as amended by Council Regulation
(EC) No 356/95 of 20 February 1995, 1995 OJ (L 41) 3; see generally David Rose, ‘The EU Trade
Barrier Regulation: An Effective Instrument for Promoting Global Harmonisation of Intellectual
Property Rights?’ (1999) 21 EIPR 313.
56 Uruguay Round Agreements Act 1994, Pub L No 103–465, 108 Stat 4809 (1994). The
conclusion of TRIPs did not prevent the United States from publishing annual Special 301 reviews
of foreign intellectual property protection. Indeed, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which
implemented the TRIPs Agreement in US law, expressly contemplated that those reviews would
continue.
57 See Neil W Netanel, ‘The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on TRIPS
Dispute Settlement’ (1997) 37 Va J Int’l L 441, 451–52; Dinwoodie, ‘A New Copyright Order’, note
12 above, 501–18; David Nimmer, ‘The End of Copyright’ (1995) 48 Vand LR 1385.
58 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 15 April
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, Legal Instruments–Results of the Uruguay Round, Vol 31, 33
ILM 112 (1994); United States–Section 211, note 17 above (reversing Panel Report that offered a
narrow interpretation of the scope of TRIPs).
59 See Dinwoodie, ‘Development of International Norms’, note 18 above, 765–66 (stressing, in
the context of the United States–Section 110(5) report, the importance of distinguishing between
the outcome and the reasoning of the panel); Austin, note 44 above.
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WTO TRIPs litigation.60 Moreover, at least in some respects, the WTO panel in
the sole copyright case to date did not try to alter radically the mix of national
autonomy and universal standards embodied in the international intellectual
property agreements.61
Yet, over time, the narrowness of the panels’ reasoning in intellectual property
disputes may unduly restrict national copyright law making, if not sufficiently
infused with normative values drawn from the stated purposes and objectives of
the TRIPS Agreement as well as the broader intellectual property literature.62
Regardless of the long-term effect of cautious panel formalism, it is clear that
the balance between national autonomy and universal norms will be a central
(if sometimes unexpressed) consideration underlying WTO panel determinations, just as it was in the drafting and revision of the classical conventions.63
Importantly, however, any recalibration of that balance may now be effected, not
only by nation state negotiators but also (and perhaps more easily) by panellists
in the WTO dispute settlement body.
An appreciation of the rhetoric, philosophy and values of the trade regime is
also important in seeking to understand how the trade context has influenced
the international intellectual property system. The enhancement of international intellectual property obligations has been bolstered, in particular, by
invocation of contemporary free trade philosophies, most notably that of

60 See Dinwoodie, ibid, 775 (discussing United States–Section 110(5) panel report); Jerome
H Reichman, ‘Securing Compliance with the TRIPs Agreement After US v India’ (1998) 1 J Int’l
Econ L 585, 594–97 (discussing India–Pharmaceutical Patents Appellate Body report); see also
United States–Section 211, note 17 above, ¶¶137, 172, 187, 215, 219 (citing dictionary definitions
of ‘as is’, ‘derogate’, ‘owner’, ‘available’, and ‘substantiate’).
61 See Dinwoodie, ibid, 764–65 (discussing United States–Section 110(5) panel report); see also
Reichman, ibid, 594–97 (discussing India–Pharmaceutical Patents Appellate Body report).
62 See Dinwoodie, ibid, 764–65 (discussing failure of United States–Section 110(5) panel
to follow through on the normative component of its definition of ‘normal’). I have written in
greater detail about the emerging WTO TRIPS jurisprudence and its effects on national policy
making choices and processes in a series of articles co-authored with Rochelle Dreyfuss. For more
detailed explanations, see Graeme B Dinwoodie and Rochelle C Dreyfuss, ‘Diversifying Without
Discriminating: Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement’, vol 13, p 445 (2007)
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology LR; Graeme B Dinwoodie and Rochelle C Dreyfuss,
‘Patenting Science: Protecting the Domain of Accessible Knowledge’, in Guibault and Hugenholtz
(eds), The Future of the Public Domain in Intellectual Property (Kluwer, 2006); Graeme B Dinwoodie
and Rochelle C Dreyfuss, ‘TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking’ (2005) 36
Case W Res J Int’l L 95; Graeme B Dinwoodie and Rochelle C Dreyfuss, ‘WTO Dispute Resolution
and the Preservation of the Public Domain of Science Under International Law’ in International
Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, Maskus and
Reichman eds (Cambridge University Press, 2006); Graeme B Dinwoodie and Rochelle C Dreyfuss,
‘International Intellectual Property Law and the Public Domain of Science’ (2004) 7 J Int’l Econ
L 431.
63

See Dinwoodie, ‘Development of International Norms’, note 18 above, 764–66.
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comparative advantage. If one country has a comparative advantage in knowledge-based products then, the argument goes, global protection of intellectual
property rights is essential to permit exploitation of that comparative advantage.
This philosophy is one of the explanations for the inclusion of copyright (indeed,
all intellectual property) within the heart of the trade regime in 1994. In political
terms, the TRIPS Agreement (which contains a significant copyright component)
can be seen as simply the product of a trade-off in which developing countries
received access to the markets of the developed world in return for enhanced levels of intellectual property protection.64 But the language of comparative advantage provides an arguably less power-centered explanation and justification for
international copyright law.
Of course, this does not immunize contemporary trade theory from criticism.
Thus, while the theory of comparative advantage touts the benefits of efficiency,
one can question the moral force of an argument that is grounded in the premise
that the developed world can take advantage of its strengths in financially lucrative technology while leaving the developing world its ‘strength’ of low-wage
manufacturing jobs. Indeed, there is an inherent tension between the theory of
comparative advantage, which in large part accepts present-day advantages
as acceptable, and the obligations of technology transfer that are included in
the TRIPS Agreement and which are an important part of development policy.
The same is true with cultural products: comparative advantage philosophy
celebrates cultural concentration; all countries have cultural goods, but because
only some have a comparative advantage this is not a problem under contemporary trade theory. But copyright theory traditionally has valued a diverse cultural
and informational ecology, particularly if copyright is understood as playing
a significant role in constructing the marketplace of ideas.
Moreover, one might also fear that the incorporation of intellectual property
agreements within trade mechanisms might (if economic concerns become paramount) deprive intellectual property policy making of the rich palette of human
values that historically has influenced its formulation. International copyright
debates would be less multidimensional if law makers sought only to enable
states to exploit their comparative advantage in copyright. Of course, the outcome of these changes may depend not only upon whether the trade context
affects the values underlying nation-to-nation negotiating— ‘let in my bananas,
we’ll cut you some slack on CDs’ becomes a more ready and explicit form of
discussion—but also upon how the binding dispute settlement system of the

64

See Gerhart, note 47 above, 370–373.
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World Trade Organization (to which the TRIPS obligations are subjected) deals
with the trade/intellectual property interface.65
Finally, one of the (arguably) unintended consequences of using the trade system
to effect the geographical expansion of intellectual property has been an increase
in critical public attention on a worldwide basis. That is, in part, because the
effects of intellectual property rights are inevitably more stark when viewed in
a context where they implicate core aspects of human subsistence more directly.
In many countries that are new to the intellectual property regime, the claims
of strong intellectual property rights are claims to be able to save the lives of
vast proportions of the community afflicted at a young age with terminal
illness, to raise large swathes of people from severe poverty through the stimulation of economic development, and to bring benefits such as literacy to more
socially isolated groups and thus enable a broader range of valuable human
experience. Critics of strong copyright protection argue that a maximalist vision
of proprietary control impedes and imperils these very same important
social objectives. Bringing the intellectual property debate into the global context
has inevitably sharpened the tenor of debate because the stakes seem far more
fundamental, and might ultimately move the trade debate itself into a debate that
transcends economic efficiency. Certainly, the nominal title of the current round
of trade negotiations—the Development Round—suggests that this is not out of
the question. The rich set of social values implicated by intellectual property is
likely to be affected by, and contribute to, such an expanded vision of trade
negotiators.

B. Lessons from Trademark: Faster and Softer Norms
A study of recent international trademark law making confirms that international intellectual property law is now effectively generated by a wide range of
different processes.66 In response to some of the same pressures discussed above,
existing international institutions have introduced new law making processes
designed to enable quicker reactions to new social and technological developments. In this category, one might include the structural reorganization of

65 See generally Rochelle C Dreyfuss & Andreas F Lowenfeld, ‘Two Achievements of the Uruguay
Round: Putting TRIPs and Dispute Settlement Together’ (1997) 37 Va J Int’l L 275; see also
Dinwoodie, ‘Development of International Norms’, note 18 above, 766–69 (discussing the influence of the trade context on the first report issued by a WTO dispute settlement panel regarding a
copyright law question).
66 See Graeme B Dinwoodie, ‘The International Intellectual Property Law System: New Actors,
New Institutions’ (2004) New Sources of, 98 Proc Am Soc’y Int’l L 213, reprinted in (2006) 10 Marq
Intell Prop L Rev 205.
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the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). WIPO has formed, and
made use of, standing committees to present proposals to the WIPO Assemblies
for adoption in the form of non-binding recommendations rather than pursuing
these same substantive goals through the mechanism of formal treaties adopted
after a longer negotiation process.67 This device has been most prevalent in
the trademark context, with the 1999 non-binding recommendation on the
treatment of well-known marks, and later adoption of a recommendation on
rules governing the concept of ‘use’ on the internet, being notable examples.68
The adoption of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP)69
by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)70
in late 1999 is another example of speedy (and novel) international intellectual
property law making. ICANN requires every registrar, offering to register domain
names in the most commercially significant generic top-level domains, to include
in its registration agreement a contractual provision whereby domain name
registrants submit to the application of the UDRP. As a result, certain disputes
between domain name registrants and trademark holders (known as cybersquatting disputes) are resolved by quasi-arbitral panels appointed by ICANNauthorized dispute settlement providers and according to substantive rules
that were developed in an unconventional process of international intellectual
property law making.71

67 See ‘Report of the Director General of WIPO’, WIPO Doc No WO/GA/23/1 ¶¶1–12
(4 September 1998) (discussing the proposal to establish standing committees), available at <http://
www.wipo.int >;Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known
Marks, WIPO Doc. No. A/34/13 at 3 (August 1999) (discussing the non-binding nature of the recommendation), at <http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/development_iplaw/pub833.htm> (last visited 7 June 2002) [hereinafter ‘Well-Known Marks Joint Recommendation’].
68 See Well-Known Marks Joint Recommendation, ibid; ‘Joint Recommendation Concerning the Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs, on the Internet’
(October 2001), available at <http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/development_iplaw/pub845.
htm> (last visited 12 May 2007); see also ‘Joint Recommendation Concerning Trademark Licenses’
(October 2000), available at <http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/development_iplaw/pub835.htm>
(last visited 12 May 2007).
69 See ‘Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy’ (24 October 1999) [hereinafter
UDRP], available at <http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm> (last visited 7 June
2002); see also ‘Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy’ (24 October 1999),
available at <http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm> [hereinafter UDRP Rules] (last
visited 7 June 2002).
70 ICANN is a not-for-profit corporation that was created by the US government to operate the
domain name system, among other things, in accordance with parameters set by the Commerce
Department. Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed Reg 31, 741 (10 June 1998).
71 See generally Laurence R Helfer and Graeme B Dinwoodie, ‘Designing Non-National Systems:
The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy’ (2001) 43 Wm & Mary LR 141
(analysing the development of the UDRP at length); Graeme B Dinwoodie, ‘(National) Trademark Laws and the (Non-National) Domain Name System’ (2000) 21 U Pa J Int’l & Econ L 495
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Without unduly minimizing the ambiguities of that process,72 in essence WIPO
acted at the request of a single member state (the United States) to produce a
report that, by virtue of delegation of de facto control of the domain name registration process from that single government,73 could be implemented by ICANN
as substantive law without the usual airings found in the intergovernmental law
making process of which WIPO is a part.74 And, as the Australian government
recognized in a submission to the TRIPs Council not long after the UDRP was
adopted, the UDRP has indeed become the international standard for resolution
of cybersquatting disputes.75
To be fair to WIPO, the Organization did try to solicit comments regarding
the proposals through alternative channels. Yet the process was quite different
from the classical intergovernmental model to which WIPO formerly adhered
(and largely still adheres). Instead, the development of the UDRP occurred
outside the traditional intergovernmental process, thus reducing the direct involvement of nation states and moving at a much brisker pace than found in the treaty
revision process.76
To be sure, both of these developments are expressly intended to produce
only soft law. The recommendations that emanate from the WIPO standing
committees and are later adopted by the WIPO Assembly are non-binding;
nations may decide without penalty whether to introduce reforms to national
law in order to comply with the recommendations.77 Likewise, the results in
UDRP proceedings can be overcome by contrary determinations in national
courts and those courts are not obliged to defer (or even refer) in any way to
the conclusions of the UDRP panel.78 Indeed, orders of UDRP panellists may
(explaining the clashes between trademark law and the domain name system that gave rise to the
non-national solution).
For a much fuller account, see Helfer and Dinwoodie, ibid.
See Andrew Christie, ‘The ICANN Domain-Name Dispute Resolution System as a Model for
Resolving Other Intellectual Property Disputes on the Internet’ (2002) 5 J World Intell Prop 105,
107–10.
74 See Helfer and Dinwoodie, note 71 above, 167–68.
75 See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO, Electronic
Commerce Work Programme: Submission from Australia, IP/C/W/233, ¶44 (7 December 2000)
(suggesting that the UDRP has ‘arguably become a de facto international standard’ for the resolution
of cybersquatting disputes), available at <http://docsonline.wto.org>.
76 See Helfer and Dinwoodie, note 71 above, 168.
77 See Well-Known Marks Joint Recommendation, note 67 above, 3 (‘this creates no legal obligation for any country, but following such a recommendation would produce practical benefits’).
78 See UDRP, note 69 above, ¶4(k) (providing that parties to UDRP disputes are not precluded
‘from submitting the dispute to a court of competent jurisdiction for independent resolution before
such mandatory administrative proceeding is commenced or after such proceeding is concluded’);
see also Sallen v Corninthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F3d 14 (1st Cir 2001) (noting that UDRP
panel decisions are not entitled to any deference in subsequent national court proceedings) (citing
72
73

82

02-Gervais-Chap02.indd 82

9/11/07 5:20:14 PM

B. Lessons from Trademark: Faster and Softer Norms
be stayed by nothing more than the losing party filing a complaint in the appropriate national court.79
But in practice these new forms of law making may produce harder law. This
solidification may happen in different ways. It can occur through traditional
public law mechanisms. For example, a number of bilateral trade agreements entered into by the United States require signatory states to ensure
that their trademark laws comply with the WIPO Joint Recommendation on
Well-Known Marks.80 WIPO also asked member states to consider whether the
different non-binding trademark recommendations adopted from 1999–2001
should be incorporated in treaties harmonizing trademark law.81 The Revised
Trademark Law Treaty, concluded in Singapore in 2006, incorporated large
parts of the earlier non-binding Recommendation on Trademark Licensing.
Alternatively, the practical structure of the soft law mechanism might cause it to
possess more enduring force than would first appear. The soft law character of the
UDRP, for example, is arguably belied by the minuscule number of cases in which
the losing party has had recourse to national courts. This pre-eminence of the

cases); compare Holger P Hestermeyer, ‘The Invalidity of ICANN’s UDRP Under National Law’
(2002) 3 Minn Intell Prop Rev 1 (suggesting that certain UDRP panel decisions may be vulnerable
to attack under French and German law because of the failure of the contractual provision submitting disputes to the UDRP to conform with national consumer protection laws regulating such contractual provisions).
79 See Well-Known Marks Joint Recommendation, note 67 above, 3 (providing that a losing
respondent’s filing a complaint with a court of mutual jurisdiction within ten business days of the panel’s decision will automatically stay the panel’s order transferring or cancelling the contested domain
name). Courts of mutual jurisdiction are determined when the trademark owner files a UDRP complaint. See, e.g. UDRP Rules, note 69 above, Rule 3(b)(xiii) (requiring that the complainant must
agree to submit to jurisdiction of a court in at least one specified ‘mutual jurisdiction’ with respect to
‘challenges to a decision... canceling or transferring the domain name’). The trademark owner must
select the courts based either where the registrar that issued the domain name registration is located, or
at the address of the domain-name holder as shown in the registrar’s Whois data. See ibid at Rule 1.
80 See Free Trade Agreement, 6 May 2003, US–Singapore, Art 16.2(b)(1) (providing that
each party shall give effect to the Joint Recommendation on Well-Known Marks), available at
<http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Section_Index.html> (last visited
7 October 2004); compare Free Trade Agreement, 6 June 2003, US–Chile, Art 17.2(9) (recognizing
the importance of the Joint Recommendation and undertaking to be guided by its principles),
available at <http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Section_Index.html>
(last visited 7 October 2004).
81 See Proposals for Further Harmonization of Formalities and Procedures in the Field of Marks,
WIPO Doc. No. SCT/8/2, ¶1 (26 April 2002) (noting that the WIPO programme for 2002–2003
includes consideration by the Standing Committee on Trademarks of the incorporation of the three
non-binding recommendations adopted from 1999–2001 in the framework of harmonization
of trademark law), available at <http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sct/en/sct_8/sct_8_2.pdf>
(last visited 12 May 2007); Suggestions for the Further Development of International Trademark
Law, WIPO Doc. No. SCT/8/3, ¶1 (26 April 2002), available at <http://www.wipo.int/edocs/
mdocs/sct/en/sct_8/sct_8_3.pdf> (last visited 12 May 2007).
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UDRP may, in part, be attributable to the advantages of UDRP proceedings in
comparison to national litigation.82
If soft law is so easily hardened, these new law-making processes deserve equal
care and attention, notwithstanding the advantages that new and faster lawmaking processes offer.83 As the Argentinian delegation stressed in the 1999
WIPO Assembly meeting, circumspection is appropriate where there is ‘creation
of de facto norms without the permanent transparency of the negotiation and
decision-making processes’.84

C. The Climate for Law Making: Forum Shifting, Balance,
Evidence, Process, and the Development Agenda
Substantive Impasse
To some extent, many of these changes could have been predicted in 1994
when the TRIPS Agreement was concluded and when the ambitious EU
legislative (and member state expansion) agenda was apparent. As momentum
toward internationalization of intellectual property law grew, it might not have
been apparent, however, that this movement would still meet substantial resistance. The agenda built in to the TRIPS Agreement, particularly the negotiation
of a multilateral register for the protection of geographical indications, review
of provisions on the patentability of plants and animals other than microorganisms, and the protection of plant varieties, has made little progress in
the TRIPS Council.85 On the copyright side, although the Internet Treaties

82 Empirical evidence of challenges in national courts is hard to gather because developing
precise data would require coordination among the different registrars to ascertain the number
of panel orders that have not been implemented because of the receipt of notice of a court action.
One (extremely useful, but now out of date) database of national court challenges to UDRP rulings
lists only 51 cases (including a mere 3 non-US cases) out of the first 4,800 UDRP panel decisions.
See The UDRP–Court Challenge Database, at <http://www. udrplaw.net/UDRPappeals.htm>.
This small number is consistent with anecdotal evidence, although some decisions (of US courts
in particular) have been handed down. See Sallen v Corinthians, note 78 above (reversing the
dismissal of an action under US law by a US domain-name registrant against a Brazilian trademark
owner seeking to override a UDRP panel decision in favor of the trademark owner); Barcelona.com,
Inc v Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F3d 611 (4th Cir 2003)(dispute between
a Spanish trademark owner and the domain-name registrant from whom a UDRP panel had previously ordered transfer of the registration in question).
83 See Helfer and Dinwoodie, note 71 above, 245–48 (discussing pace of law making through
interpretation of the UDRP).
84 ‘General Report of the Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO,’ 34th Annual Meeting,
Doc A/34/16, ¶178 (September 1999), available at <http://wipo.int>.
85 See Paul Vandoren, ‘The Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement’ (1999) 2 J World Intell
Prop L 25.
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were concluded in 1996, the Database Treaty that was also scheduled for
discussion at the Geneva Diplomatic Conference has been shelved.86 The 2000
Diplomatic Conference on an audiovisual performers’ treaty collapsed without
agreement.87 And, important issues relevant to copyright in the digital era (for
example, service provider liability) have been dealt with by intergovernmental
organizations only in the context of informational workshops. Similarly, negotiations on a version of the draft Hague Agreement on Jurisdiction and Recognition
of Judgments that broadly encompassed intellectual property reached an impasse
in 2001, with intellectual property proving to be a principal sticking point.
The prospects for new subject-specific treaties, let alone a broad-based TRIPS II,
seem dim.
Yet, reaching this impasse has taken substantial work on all sides. As noted
above, intellectual property owners have continued to push an ambitious agenda
for international law making and have done so on a range of issues where
widespread international experience (let alone international consensus) has
been lacking. For example, although developing countries are only now establishing the patent regimes required by TRIPS (because of transitional provisions
that postponed implementation dates), the WIPO Standing Committee on
Patents (SCP) has been considering further harmonization of substantive patent
standards.88
To some extent, the advocacy of greater internationalization of intellectual
property can generally be explained by the reasons discussed above in the copyright context. But institutional competition may also partially explain the
phenomenon. The decision to deploy trade mechanisms was in part a reflection
of 15 years of little perceived progress at WIPO (at least as viewed by the developed world and by the United States in particular).89 But the sudden emergence
of the WTO as part of the international intellectual property law-making process
seemed to energize WIPO, resulting in the conclusion of several new treaties in

86 WIPO Copyright Treaty, and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, both at note
52 above.
87 See, e.g. ‘WIPO Members Fail to Agree on Performers’ Rights for Audiovisual Treaty’ (2001)
61 Pat Trademark & Copyright J (BNA) 231.
88 See Chapter 13 below (Rochelle C Dreyfuss and Jerome H Reichman).
89 See Susan K Sell, ‘Intellectual Property Protection and Antitrust in the Developing World:
Crisis, Coercion and Choice’ (1995) 49 Int Orgs 315, 321; Peter Drahos, ‘Global Property Rights in
Information: The Story of TRIPs at the GATT’ (1995) 13 Prometheus 6, 9.
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copyright,90 patent,91 and trademark law92 and the promulgation of non-binding
recommendations.
Despite all this activity, however, with the exception of the Internet Treaties,
the only formal treaties concluded at WIPO have been primarily procedural:
the Patent Law Treaty, the Revised Trademark Law Treaty and a revised Hague
Designs Convention. Thus, despite the efforts of intellectual property owners,
and despite the incentive for WIPO to reassert its primacy in a trade-structured
system of international intellectual property law, WIPO has not been much
more successful than the WTO in turning the pressure for greater internationalization into new substantive treaties.
Multiplication of Fora
There are several causes for this impasse and each highlights an important
aspect of the current law-making climate. Those opposed to further internationalization (or further international enhancement of intellectual property
rights, at least) mimicked the strategy adopted by the developed world in
1986 and have engaged in what some have called forum shifting.93 This has
involved raising issues of intellectual property in a number of international fora
other than the WTO or WIPO, many of which were more philosophically or
structurally sympathetic to the cause of developing countries. These initiatives
seek not only to enrich (and complicate) the debate in ways that decelerate the
law-making process, but also in the long term to generate rival norms that will
compete in the international arena with any norms emanating from international
institutions more supportive of intellectual property interests.94 Thus, at the
multilateral level, we have seen numerous policy making initiatives in an

90 See WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, both at
note 52 above.
91 See Patent Law Treaty, 2 June 2000, 39 ILM 1047.
92 See Trademark Law Treaty (27 October 1994) WIPO Doc No WO027EN, available at
<http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/en/wo/wo027en.html> (accessed 12 May 2007).
93 See Laurence R Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking’ (2004) 29 Yale J Int’l L 1 (discussing ‘regime shifting’);
John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2000),
564 (suggesting different forms of ‘forum shifting’); Chapter 11 below (Peter Drahos).
94 This proliferation of political institutions raises hard questions. Is there to be a normative
reconstruction of the system away from ‘intellectual property organizations’, or will the more complex debate still operate entirely within the rubric of the existing system? More strategically for
developing countries, while forum shifting has proven to be a very good strategy for the blocking of
further international agreement, it may cause too much of a cacophony when pursuing a positive
international agenda, such as mandatory users’ rights. See below. Moreover, forum shifting worked
for the developed world in 1994 because there was a package trade deal to be concluded. Is the
developing world ready to trade away user rights in one field for enhanced intellectual property
protection in others, and what will that do to the existing coalitions?
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increased number of international fora (some of which had not previously
addressed intellectual property law).95
Users’ Rights and ‘Balance’
As an inevitable part of generating counter-norms, the international intellectual
property system is beginning to grapple with the idea of internationally mandated ceilings on protection to accompany the floors that have been established
over the past century. These ceilings, which might be called ‘users’ rights’ or ‘substantive maxima’, are, conceptually, not well fleshed out at present.96 But user
groups and developing countries have come to accept that the ultimate substantive
outcome of international negotiations will be closer to that which they desire
(typically, national autonomy to maintain lower levels of protection) if their
agenda assumes a positive form.97 The development of such users’ rights is an
important part of the political movement which, though it adopts many names,
might best be labelled as the ‘Access to Knowledge’ or ‘A2K’ movement.
The Development Agenda advanced in a number of more formal institutional settings by a group of developing countries self-styled as Friends of
Development is the institutional cousin of A2K. WIPO has acknowledged the
importance of the Development Agenda by creating a Provisional Committee
(the PCDA) to consider more concretely what shape a development component of WIPO’s work would take. Although developing countries have been
gratified by an institutional focus on development, they have been careful to
ensure that the creation of the PCDA does not prevent the discussion of so-called

95 The multiplication of fora has extended to the judicial, as well as treaty making, arena. See
Anheuser–Busch, Inc v Portugal, Application No 73049/01, (Judgment of Grand Chamber, ECtHR,
11 January 2007) (holding that trademark applications were protected ‘property’ within the meaning of the European Convention on Human Rights).
96 See Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss, ‘Patenting Science’, note 62 above.
97 Of course, we should not expect these changes, the international adoption of substantive
rights, to ensure ideal substantive balance. If one were to devise the ideal first phase of substantive
maxima or users’ rights, it might be appropriate that the binding scope of such instruments be
limited. As with efforts to develop substantive minima in the late nineteenth century, lasting results
might best be achieved by securing widespread agreement on the basic concept, and then building
on that over time. Moreover, there is a tension between mandating extensive users’ rights and
respecting the value of national autonomy, one aspect of balance that distinguishes national from
international policy making. Member states should, at some level, be permitted room for choice as
to the exceptions they wish, and as to the form of implementation. There may need to be a users’rights
parallel to Art 1(1) of TRIPS. See Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss, note 62 above. Of course, one can minimize this tension by viewing national autonomy in terms broader than simply being free from
formal constraints on national law making. Instead, if national autonomy possessed a more affirmative resonance, we might understand the term to mean the capacity of a nation state effectively to
achieve its potential unimpeded by international constraints.
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development agenda issues in other contexts, highlighting that the Development
Agenda has strategic as well as substantive objectives.
The debate about substantive maxima, or users’ rights, is part of a broader debate
regarding the concept of ‘balance’ that has routinely been invoked in domestic
intellectual property law making and is now become a nominal touchstone
(or rhetorical ploy) in international intellectual property policy discussions.98
Thus, domestic policy makers have sought to accord sufficiently generous
rights to achieve the social goals that underlie the grant of protection without
conferring so much exclusivity that we in fact impede the pursuit of those
very social objectives. Courts frequently claim to be guided by the same concern
of balance in interpreting ambiguous or open-ended provision.
Even at the domestic level, the assessment of ‘balance’ operates almost as a
Rorschach test. The balance (let alone the oft-cited ‘delicate balance’) that
intellectual property strives to achieve is a rather protean concept. Yet, it is now
increasingly common to hear international instruments decried or celebrated
depending upon their concern for balance. Every side claims the mantle of
balance. For critics of enhanced international protection of intellectual property,
this is an attractive rhetorical tool because, unlike domestic political processes,
the classical international intellectual property system did not purport to
establish a particular substantive balance. Thus, most international treaties established floors below which protection could not fall, but imposed no ceilings
on protection. For critics, this was incontrovertible proof that the classical international system produced unbalanced intellectual property policy, which the
contemporary regime must correct.99
Of course, this assessment somewhat ignored the more complex balancing that
the classical international system was pursuing, including the balance of national
with international regulation.100 Also, the classical system typically gave great
weight to national autonomy, establishing only loose parameters within which
national political processes could strike a substantive balance appropriate to
the circumstances of each domestic order.101 Yet, as the realities of national political
economies and the pressures created by bilateral trade agreements began to
produce national laws that increasingly favoured intellectual property interests,
critics have sought to inject discussion of substantive balance into the international debate.
98 I discuss the complexities of ‘balance’ in greater length in Dinwoodie, ‘The WIPO Copyright
Treaty’, note 42 above.
99 See ibid.
100 See ibid.
101 See ibid.
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This enrichment of the debate is surely appropriate given the enhanced role
of international norms in framing national laws, the feedback loop between
national and international law making, the bilateral trade pressures that seek
to exploit the path-dependent character of an international system that only
imposes floors, and the different historical conditions to which the classical and
contemporary system are each responding. However, it must also be recognized
that the balancing performed in the international system has always been more
complex than in the domestic environment and has become more so in recent
years. TRIPS, for example, added new vectors of balance, such as that between
ideal rules of intellectual property and other gains that developing countries
might wish to pursue in trade negotiations, for example market access or technology transfer.102 Moreover, just as the classical balance between national
autonomy and universal standards may need revision in the light of digital
technologies, so too the substantive balance of rights might need to be altered
as the mix of legal rights and effective enforcement generates new practical
levels of exclusivity.103
Evidence-Based Law Making
In addition to the development of rival substantive norms to ensure substantive
balance, critics of further international intellectual property law making have
deployed a number of arguments directed towards international process or
the structure of international law making. The most common such refrain is
that an international solution is premature, or that there is no evidence on the
national level that would suggest an ideal international norm. Evidence-based
intellectual property law making has become a drag on what many intellectual
property owners would seek to achieve.
The call for evidence and experimentation clearly echo an essential feature of
the classical system. Rochelle Dreyfuss, writing about ambitious patent law
harmonization,104 has helpfully characterized the alternative approach of extensive international standards as ‘trickle down’, in that new approaches to problems
would have to be devised first at the international level and then implemented
by states.105 Such experimentation will inevitably lack the comparative and

See ibid.
In quite which direction adjustment would be made is an open question: digital technology
may make works more vulnerable to appropriation, but it might also allow copyright owners to capture
greater rents through the application of technological protection measures. See note 166 below
(discussing Copyright Directive provision on levies and digital rights management).
104 See also Chapter 13 below.
105 See Rochelle C Dreyfuss, ‘Creative Law Making: A Comment on Lionel Bently, Trade
Development and Multiple Layers of Lawmaking: Copyright, Translations and Relations Between
102
103
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context-specific character of the historical lessons of which the classical system
made good use. Instead, Dreyfuss argues that Professor Reichman’s call for a
moratorium on further public international law making might make sense:
‘a trickle up approach, one that internationalizes law only after disparate regimes
have had time to operate, is a better way to develop a jurisprudence that meets
emerging needs’.106 While this observation holds true as a general matter, the
classical model might still need at least two modifications to meet contemporary demands while holding true to the merits of national autonomy and
experimentations: there may be a greater need to internationalize quickly today
than was the case in the late nineteenth century; and if the concept of users’ rights
gains a foothold, international law making may be important to constrain expansions in rights under national laws.107
Like the rhetoric of balance, the call for evidence-based law making at the international level mirrors long-standing debates at the domestic level.108 Indeed,
there has been a resurgence in calls for empirical evidence as a prerequisite to new
rights at the national level too.109 And, the European Union has pioneered the
development of empirical studies assessing the effect of new rights with the introduction into many directives of requirements that the Commission produce a
report on the operation of a new law five years after implementation.110 (Of
course, in the European Union, these reports have typically, with some
exceptions,111 been commissioned after the introduction of new rights, and

Britain and India 1880–1914’ (forthcoming, 2007) 82 Chi–Kent LR. This is a somewhat different
and more limited form of experimentation. It replicates to some extent how the European Union has
merged a desire for empirically sound laws with its impetus to harmonize. Thus, in its initial copyright directives, the EU adopted a harmonized solution and has required the Commission to produce a study after five years analysing the success of the harmonization instrument. Putting aside the
much less varied experiments that this allows, the experience of the Database review casts some
doubt about the value that the Commission will attach to negative reviews of the harmonization
exercise. Institutional economics suggests that it will be hard to undo the harmonization.
Ibid.
See Dinwoodie, ‘The WIPO Copyright Treaty’, note 42 above (noting tension between users’
rights and national autonomy).
108 See Robert W Kastenmeier and Michael J Remington, ‘The Semiconductor Chip Protection
Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground?’ (1985) 70 Minn LR 417.
109 See ‘Gowers Review of Intellectual Property’ (5 December 2006), available at <http://
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/583/91/pbr06_gowers_report_755.pdf>; see also Chapter 1 above
(Daniel J Gervais).
110 See, for example, Institute for Information Law, Recasting of Copyright & Related Rights for the
Knowledge Economy (2007) (report on the Copyright Directive), available at <http://www.ivir.nl/
publications/other/IViR_Recast_Final_Report_2006.pdf>.
111 The exceptions have tended to be where some policy makers proposed constricting
rights, such as studies on whether to move from EU to international exhaustion. Advocates of users’
rights should thus be aware of the capacity of calls for evidence-based law making to preserve
the status quo.
106
107
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the appetite for repeal of rights is often non-existent even after reports sceptical
of the economic benefits of the new rights.)112
Again, the call for evidence mirrors a mindset that operated under the classical
international system. It too is emblematic of a different approach to international
law, and thus, its persuasiveness is affected, on a case-by-case basis, by some of the
arguments above regarding the need for speedier and more extensive international solutions in an era of global trade and porous borders. It surely would have
been a persuasive argument that, in the classical era, counselled caution that
a proposed international agreement would require changes to 169 different laws
of a signatory party, as critics of a recent US–Korea trade agreement charged
of one draft of that agreement.113
By the same token, the rhetorical assertion by critics that the free trade agreement would ‘violate 169 Korean laws’ suggests a commitment to nationalism at
odds even with the classical era’s lax approach to enforcement of international
law. Instead, what that rhetoric reflects is the imbalance in the extent of obligations being undertaken in international agreements. At the point in time when
the Korean delegation had agreed to change 169 laws, the United States had not
made any concessions requiring amendment of its laws. Thus, although critics
of contemporary international law making may adopt some of the language of
the classical system, they are also effectively seeking to broaden that debate by
reference to the substance of the commitments undertaken and not merely the
process-type questions of national autonomy, or evidence-based law making.114
Process Critiques
Process-based critiques of the international intellectual property political system
have also become a dominant refrain in recent debates. For example, critics of the
recent webcasting treaty proposal complained that there was law making taking
place in Geneva by ‘unelected officials’ without a proper airing domestically first.
To some extent, the process-based critiques of the international intellectual property system are critiques of the system of international law in general: a lack of
accountability, democracy deficit, lack of transparency, and ‘one size fits all’.
Thus, one could simply subsume debate about these issues within the broader
ongoing discussion about the contemporary system of international law. But
112 See Commission of the European Communities, ‘First Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC
on the legal Protection of Databases’ (Brussels, December 2005), available at: <http://ec.europa.
eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_report_en.pdf>.
113 See ‘SK–US Free Trade Deal Would Violate 169 Korean Laws: Critics,’ The Hankyoreh,
17 January 2007, at <http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=6933>.
114 See note 97 above (suggesting a recasting of ‘national autonomy’).
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reforms at both the national and international level can help to preserve the
flexibilities that enabled countries to adopt balanced intellectual property
laws under the classical system. Rochelle Dreyfuss and I have suggested, for
example, formalizing and institutionalizing values of transparency and inclusiveness by requiring APA-like notice and comment procedures prior to the
adoption of bilateral trade agreements; these bilateral agreements are currently
operating as the primary brake on the exercise of the flexibilities that remain
in the multilateral system.115
The Role of NGOs
There has been exponential growth in the number of non-governmental organizations who are working on issues of international intellectual property. This can
be explained, in part, by a number of developments, including the use of the
internet to develop cross-border advocacy, which are by no means specific to
intellectual property. But this is also, in part, a function of increased awareness
(and funding) that has come from the global expansion of the discipline.
The increase in NGO activity on all sides raises a number of problems. While it
has surely enhanced the range of views that contribute to the global debate, it has
added to the problems of cacophony. And, NGOs suffer from many of the same
process problems (lack of accountability, representativeness deficits, cultural
imperialism, and ‘one size fits all’) that NGOs highlight when states act internationally contrary to the positions advocated by NGOs. Indeed, at least states
acting internationally are typically accountable at some level of remove from
the decision in question; that cannot even be said of NGOs.
To be sure, NGOs do not possess the power to bind countries and thus we might
not wish to hold them to the same standards as nation states. However, it does, at
least, make them somewhat unsteady bearers of the banner for process or institutional reform. Indeed, typically, NGOs are not animated by process concerns,
but rather by substantive social goals. Few activist groups clamour under the
banner of national autonomy, transparency or accountability. NGOs use all
these arguments, of course, but only to serve their particular substantive goals.

115

See Chapter 4 below (Anselm Kamperman Sanders).
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Part III Private Litigation and Private Ordering
The broader process of harmonization, which some of the developments
discussed above exemplify, presents many challenges.116 To the extent that these
different law-making forces are causing a convergence around common rules
of intellectual property, however, one might suggest that a more intrusive
substantive international intellectual property law is growing through public
law mechanisms.117 Yet rules of similarly de facto global reach may be occurring
in private litigation and through private ordering. The universalizing effects
of each of these law-making forces—not considered part of the classical
public international intellectual property system—offer similar benefits, but
may implicate similar concerns, as the results achieved through the public
international law-making process. Typically, however, they receive relatively little
scrutiny.

A. Private Litigation
Ad Hoc Development of Private International Law
The panel decisions issued under the UDRP by ICANN-authorized disputesettlement providers, previously discussed, have clearly established international
norms on the practice of cybersquatting.118 Likewise, any efforts by national
courts to adjudicate domain-name disputes clearly have an effect beyond national
borders; domain-name/trademark rules in the generic top-level domains are truly
non-national.119 Or, stated less tendentiously, such decisions by national courts
may have substantial effects in a number of countries. The only means by which
this proposition could be altered radically might be through relief mandating the
deployment of measures that effect virtual territorialization.120

116 See Graeme B Dinwoodie, ‘The Integration of International and Domestic Intellectual
Property Lawmaking’ (2000) 23 Colom–VLA JL & Arts 307, 310 (discussing EU harmonization of
intellectual property laws).
117 See Ginsburg, note 16 above.
118 See text accompanying note 71 above.
119 See, e.g. Sallen v Corinthians, note 78 above (action by US domain-name registrant to recover
registration from Brazilian trademark owner without equivalent US trademark registration);
Heathmount AE Corp v Technodome.com, 2000 WL 33666935, 60 USPQ2d 2018 (ED Va 2000)
(applying US law to dispute between Canadian parties because domain name registered with registrar located in the United States).
120 See ‘Geography and the Net: Putting It in Its Place’ (11 August 2001) Economist,18–20.
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There are many other (apparently more traditional) contexts in which national
courts are beginning to tackle cases with broader international ramifications
and thus contribute to the effective creation of international rules. This has
occurred most perceptibly, and most readily, in the copyright context. Several
courts in the United States, with the encouragement of the Second Circuit,121
one of the leading appellate courts in copyright matters, have permitted
plaintiffs to pursue actions alleging claims under several disparate foreign copyright laws;122 courts are more consciously separating jurisdiction to adjudicate
from questions of applicable law. There is also growing acceptance throughout
the United States of a doctrinal device, first used by the Second Circuit, whereby
relief will be granted in respect of both domestic and overseas acts of infringement where a predicate act of infringement occurred within the United States
and enables further reproduction abroad.123 In both these ways, US courts have
provided multinational relief and, in the latter case, have effectively applied a
single rule to international conduct.124 (Even copyright courts that forswear

121 See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd v Walt Disney Co, 145 F3d 481, 484 (2d Cir 1998)
(reversing district court’s dismissal of claims under foreign copyright laws on forum non coveniens
grounds).
122 See, e.g. Carell v Shubert Org, Inc, 104 F Supp 2d 236, 257–59 (SDNY 2000) (permitting
claims based on foreign copyright laws to proceed notwithstanding the plaintiff ’s failure to specify
in her complaint the particular countries under whose laws the claims were made); Armstrong v
Virgin Records, Ltd, 91 F Supp 2d 628, 637–38 (SDNY 2000) (entertaining claims based on unspecified foreign copyright laws on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and pendent jurisdiction); Frink
Am, Inc v Champion Road Mach, Ltd, 961 F Supp 398, 404–05 (NDNY 1997) (declining to dismiss
claim under Canadian copyright law). But see ITSI, note 29 above (refusing motion to amend complaint to assert claim under Mexican copyright law).
123 See Los Angeles News Serv v Reuters TV Int’l, Ltd, 149 F3d 987 (9th Cir 1998), later proceeding, 340 F3d 926 (9th Cir 2003); see also Peter Rosenbaum Photography v Otto Doosan Mail Order,
76 USPQ2d 1759 (ND Ill 2005). The device had long been accepted by the Second Circuit. See
Sheldon v Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, note 22 above, 52. But the Ninth Circuit had previously expressed
some doubt regarding the rule. See Subafilms, note 33 above, 1094.
124 Although courts applying this theory have applied a single law to the multinational event,
it is not inevitable that courts seeking to provide relief for multinational infringement in a single
proceeding must apply a single law. Courts could assume jurisdiction over all the related claims
but apply different national laws to the different heads of conduct occurring in different jurisdictions, determining liability on a country-by-country basis. See Austin, note 44 above, 130–31.
Indeed, the new willingness of courts to assume jurisdiction over claims of infringement of foreign
copyright law makes this a more plausible alternative. See text accompanying notes 69–74 above.
For reasons I have explained at length elsewhere (Dinwoodie, ‘A New Copyright Order’, note 12
above, 542–79) I favour the application of a single substantive rule (but not necessarily one found
in the domestic law of a single nation state, let alone one determined using the vagaries of the predicate act or root copy theory) to copyright disputes that are inherently international. Moreover, in the
context of online posting of allegedly infringing material, this possibility of applying different laws
on the question of liability is very difficult in practical terms. And, although one could award damages in respect only of countries where posting would amount to infringement, injunctive relief is
more difficult to fashion absent a willingness to issue orders regulating the nature of online use or
imposing technologically-grounded obligations. See note 126 below (discussing Yahoo! litigation).
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the extraterritorial application of the copyright statute may to some extent be
regulating globally when they apply choice of law rules that easily localize any
internet conduct in the United States.)125
These trends are less evident in patent and trademark cases, where the classical
role of national courts has remained more constant. Yet even here, some US courts
have been willing to become embroiled in multinational disputes and apply what
in practice is a rule of much more than national scope.126 Whereas copyright law
has formally adhered to a rule proscribing extraterritorial application,127 US
courts have been less restrained in applying the Lanham Act to conduct with a
much more tenuous US connection,128 other than some of the parties involved.129
And the enactment of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act in 1999
has occasioned even more intrusive US judicial regulation of international
domain-name space, particularly (though not exclusively) through the capacious
in rem cause of action granted to trademark owners who cannot obtain jurisdiction in personam over a domain-name registrant.130 In the patent context, the

125 See Dinwoodie, ‘A New Copyright Order’, note 12 above, 537 (discussing the ease with
which internet copyright-infringing conduct can be localized in the United States).
126 Some courts, however, have sought to be careful in fashioning relief in ways that respect
the foreign interests in the dispute before them. See, e.g. Playboy v Chuckleberry, note 33 above;
Sterling Drug v Bayer, note 33 above. Although the use of injunctive relief tailored to accommodate
competing interests occurs more frequently (and thus, perhaps, more easily) in trademark cases
(see ‘Joint Resolution Concerning the Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial Property Rights
in Signs, on the Internet’, note 68 above (suggesting the remedies to be afforded successful plaintiffs in online trademark disputes)) it is also possible in copyright cases. See Dinwoodie, ‘A New
Copyright Order’, note 12 above, 558–69 (applying substantive law method to choice of law
dilemma in international copyright disputes). This makes somewhat surprising the response of
US courts and (most) US commentators (in a non–intellectual property context) to the efforts of
the French judge in the well-publicized Yahoo! litigation to find a solution that took account of the
values of different affected nation states. See Yahoo! Inc v Le Ligue Contre Le Racism et L’Antisémitisme,
145 F Supp 2d 1168 (ND Cal 2001), rev’d, 433 F3d 1199 (9th Cir 2006).
127 See Subafilms, note 33 above.
128 Lanham (Trademark) Act 1946—Title 15 of the US Code. See Nintendo of Am, Inc v Aeropower
Co, 34 F3d 246, 249 n5 (4th Cir 1994).
129 See, e.g. Ocean Garden, Inc v Marktrade Co, 953 F2d 500 (9th Cir 1991).
130 Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub L No 106–113, 113 Stat 1501A–545
(codified as 15 USC § 1125(d)(2)); see also Heathmount v Technodome, note 119 above (exercising in
rem jurisdiction over a domain name registered with a registrar located in the United States in a dispute
between Canadian parties); Globalsantafe Corp v Globalsantafe.com, 250 F Supp2d 610 (ED Va 2003);
America Online Inc v AOL.org, 259 F Supp2d 449 (ED Va 2003). More all-encompassing US regulation of the domain-name space in the long term might occur through the operation of a complementary, but largely unheralded, provision also introduced by the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act, even if this provision has been surprisingly under-used to date. This provision, codified as §32(2)(D)(v) of the Lanham Act, permits domain-name owners aggrieved at the loss of a
UDRP proceeding, and hence of their domain-name registration, to bring a claim in US federal
court seeking (i) a declaration that their domain-name registration does not violate the Lanham
Act, and (ii) an order returning the domain-name registration. The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, in the first appellate consideration of this provision, read §32(2)(D)(v) to offer ‘disappointed
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Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has just issued an opinion narrowly
interpreting the jurisdiction of US courts to adjudicate foreign patent claims
along with their US counterpart patents in US courts, as Japanese and German
courts have done. But that opinion did so over a vigorous dissent by Judge
Newman.131 Similarly, although the US Supreme Court recently narrowed the
broad extraterritorial scope given by the Federal Circuit to the provisions of the
US patent statute consciously aimed at effecting some external regulation, judicial interpretation of other terms of the patent statute in a transborder context
has effectively resulted in the application of US patent law to activities legally
occurring abroad.132 As a practical matter, these new private law developments
occurring in national courts increasingly may come to comprise and generate
the content of international intellectual property law.
Moreover, courts have expressed some interest in the dynamic between public
international intellectual property standards and the role of national courts. One
court has found that a plaintiff could, through the vehicle of section 44(b) of the
Lanham Act, advance a claim based upon violation of standards found in the

[UDRP] participants with a chance to have any unfavorable UDRP decision reviewed in a
US court.’ Sallen v Corinthians, note 78 above, 28 (emphasis in original). A textual analysis of
§32(2)(D)(v) suggests that the US court’s determination of non-infringement (and hence of the
ownership of the domain-name registration) would turn on the application of US law. And, under
a traditional view of US trademark principles, the ability of the successful UDRP trademark
complainant to resist a §32(2)(D)(v) claim by the domain-name registrant would appear to
rest upon the trademark owner possessing US rights. I am unaware of any similar provision in
other countries that might redress this elevation of US courts and US rights. In any event, the
number of ‘appeals’ of UDRP decisions filed in the US courts (see note 82 above) suggests that
US law may come essentially to apply to most domain name disputes because of broader social and
economic forces. See also Dinwoodie, ‘A New Copyright Order’, note 12 above, 577–79 (discussing
copyright law).
131 See Voda v Cordis Corp, 476 F3d 887 (Fed Cir 2007) (Newman J, dissenting); see also
KK Coral Corp v Marine Bio KK, Case No 1943(wa)/2002 (Tokyo District Court, 16 October 2003);
see also Nahoko Ono, ‘Cross-Border Patent Infringement: The Coral Powder Case, Where a Japanese
Court Applies US Law’ (July, 2005), Report Prepared for Annual Meeting of ATRIP (Montreal);
Hitachi v Seji Yonezawa, Case No H16 (ju) 781, Supreme Court of Japan (17 October 2006),
reported at WIPO Intellectual Property Report 10–11 (December 2006) (interpreting the statutory
right of employee-inventors to receive reasonable compensation for the transfer of rights as permitting account to be taken of the profits that the employer derived from foreign patents). The capacity
of German courts to continue this practice may have been adversely affected by a recent ruling of
the European Court of Justice regarding the interpretation of the Brussels Regulation. See Case
C–4/03,Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnick mbH & Co KG (GAT) v Lamell und Kupplungsbau (LUK),
37 IIC 742 (2006)(ECJ 13 July 2006); Roche Nederland BV, 37 IIC 865 (2006)(ECJ 13 July 2006);
see generally Annette Kur, ‘A Farewell to Cross-border Injunctions? The ECJ decisions GAT/LuK
and Roche Nederland BV/Primus and Goldberg v Primus’ (2006) C–593/03, 37 I.I.C. 844.
132 See NTP Inc v Research in Motion, Ltd, 418 F3d 1282 (Fed Cir 2005), replacing 392 F3d
1336 (2004); Microsoft Corp v AT & T Corp, 127 S. Ct 1746 (2007), reversing, AT & T Corp v
Microsoft Corp, 414 F3d 1366 (Fed Cir 2005); see generally Graeme B Dinwoodie, ‘Developing a
Private International Law of Intellectual Property’ (forthcoming).
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Paris Convention rather than being limited to the causes of action expressly
delineated in the Lanham Act.133 The development and content of public international intellectual property law has also informed judicial analysis of forum
non conveniens issues in several international copyright and trademark cases.134
Scholars have also suggested that the choice of law methodologies that US
courts have developed in copyright cases, acting free of the constraints of treaty
provisions regarding choice of law, might include reference to substantive public
international copyright law. I refer here, not only to my own proposal that wellestablished international principles contribute to the identification of a substantive governing rule in international copyright cases, but also to suggestions
previously made by Jane Ginsburg that provisions in international copyright
treaties might serve as a baseline standard to ensure that the foreign law a national
court applies complies with international minimum standards. In this fashion,
Professor Ginsburg would ensure that the country whose law was applied does
not act as a haven for copyright infringers.135
In each of these contexts, one finds an echo of the tension underlying the
public law debate in the 1880s: the contest remains one that pits notions of
universality against those of national autonomy. This is seen in the public international context proper, as might be expected, but also in the development of

133 See Gen Motors Corp v Lopez, 948 F Supp 684 (ED Mich 1996). The majority of cases have
read US law less expansively. See Mattel, Inc v MCA Records, Inc, 296 F3d 894, 907–08 (9th Cir
2002) (limiting benefits of §44 to the right of national treatment); Int’l Cafe, SAL v Hard Rock Cafe
Int’l (USA), Inc, 252 F3d 1274, 1277–78 (11th Cir 2001) (same).
134 See Murray v British Broadcasting Corp, 81 F3d 287, 290–91 (2d Cir 1996) (analysing the
national treatment obligation in international copyright law); Creative Tech, Ltd v Aztech Sys, Ltd,
61 F3d 696, 700–01 (9th Cir 1995) (giving weight to the principles of national treatment and territoriality); ibid, 706 (Ferguson J, dissenting) (same); see also Heathmount, note 119 above (considering the nature of ICANN proceedings); see also Subafilms, note 33 above, 109–98 (taking into
account recent developments in international copyright law in determining the territorial scope
of the copyright statute). The dynamic between public and private international law is complex.
A British court recently invoked the public international process of intellectual property harmonization as support for revision of long-standing rules of private international law. See Griggs Group v
Evans, 2005 Ch D 153 (HC 2004), later proceeding, 2005 FSR 31 (CA 2005) (UK). In contrast,
the Canadian Supreme Court appears to see private international law as an interim solution pending
public law harmonization. Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn
Of Internet Providers (‘Tariff 22’), 2004 SCC 45, 32 CPR (4th) 1 (SC 2004) (Canada). This disagreement reflects a philosophical debate that has been taking place for centuries within the field of
private international law itself. See Arthur Taylor von Mehren, ‘Special Substantive Rules for
Multistate Problems: Their Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology’
(1974) 88 Harv LR 347 (discussing competing objectives of avoiding forum shopping and ensuring
apt results).
135 See Ginsburg, ‘Private International Law Aspects’, note 23 above; Jane C Ginsburg, ‘Private
International Law Aspects of the Protection of Works and Objects of Related Rights Transmitted
Through Digital Networks, 2000 Update’ (2000) WIPO Doc No PIL/01/02, available at <http://
wipo.int>.
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rules that encourage national courts in private litigation to develop multinational
solutions and to engage with public law standards. National courts, it may properly be said, now contribute to the development of international intellectual
property law.
Systematic Approaches
Efforts to create a more systematic approach to transborder intellectual property
disputes began in the 1990s with the draft Hague Convention, later built upon
by the Dreyfuss–Ginsburg proposal. Strictly speaking, such treaties as were
proposed might best be described as ‘public private international law’, to borrow
Steve Burbank’s nomenclature.136 These treaties would not directly have determined the appropriate rules of substantive international intellectual property
law, but rather would have framed the manner in which we determine the appropriate rules.
The treaty route appears unlikely to succeed in the foreseeable future. But other
efforts to develop a more systematic approach to these disputes remain active,
most notably the ALI Project on the development of a set of Principles, and the
ongoing work of the Max Planck Group on Conflicts of Laws in Intellectual
Property (CLIP). At their most basic, these proposals address the practical
problems of litigating national rights in an increasingly non-national world.
More systemically, they would establish the basic conditions under which national
courts would contribute to and develop a form of international intellectual property law. Thus, these proposals would instal the elemental architecture of this
(nationally constructed) part of the international intellectual property system,
with the precise design to be decided on an ongoing basis by national courts
(checked by legislatures) operating within that structure.137
But why should we expend any effort on developing these systems of private international intellectual property law? The development of substantive international
rules, and the mediation of the competing values of national autonomy and universal rules, through national court jurisprudence may possess advantages over
public law processes (whether classical or new). When compared with the traditional negotiation of treaties, national court development of ‘international law’ is
more responsive to social conditions and hence more dynamic; and it is more

136 See Stephen B Burbank, ‘Jurisdictional Equilibration, The Proposed Hague Convention, and
Progress in National Law’ (2001) 49 Am J Comp L 203, 204.
137 Obviously, if there is no single treaty establishing the system of transborder adjudication, no
immediate ‘elemental architecture’ will arise. That would depend upon the extent of the adoption of
the soft law principles by countries, and the extent of the reference to the ALI Principles by courts.
See Dinwoodie, ‘Developing a Private International Law’, note 132 above.
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readily subject to refinement by a range of national political institutions.
Moreover, the articulation of cross-border relief under a single rule by a national
court, or (to use the language of my own earlier proposal) the development of a
substantive rule of national law applicable to international cases, would not result
in the premature entrenchment of such a rule as a higher norm of international
law in the way that WTO dispute-settlement body rulings in practice might do.
At bottom, national court decisions are local law that remains subject to national
legislative reversal or modification. And, while courts would be expected to refer to
other national court decisions (both domestic and foreign), they would also be
formally free to depart from those decisions, retaining the value of national
experimentation that is crucial to the classical model of international intellectual
property law.138
Moreover, this means of developing international intellectual property law is
less subject to the political demands that historically have burdened the public
international process and that continue to limit its efficacy. To the extent that
agreement on substantive harmonized rules (especially forward-looking rules) is
fast becoming impossible because of the number of interested parties with disparate agendas in the intellectual property law-making process, this alternative
form of law making offers a greater prospect of progress. It is uncertain whether
the systems of active national court involvement facilitated by the procedural
mechanisms adopted by the ALI and under consideration elsewhere would produce rules more favourable to supporters or opponents of expansive intellectual
property protection. But one value of these systems as law-making instruments
may in fact lie in the common uncertainty as to the rules that they might
produce. Negotiating for certainty, whether in substantive rules of intellectual
property law or in the allocation of prescriptive authority between international
and national law, has proven a difficult endeavour of late.
Critics of this purported procedural neutrality might argue that such systems
embed quite partisan values, although broader systemic values than those underlying intellectual property policy alone. For example, almost every proposal would
establish procedural rules that clearly contemplate the possibility of some degree
of cross-border relief, of decisions that effect change beyond national borders, or
of the universalization of certain values and rules. This critique is descriptively
accurate, but unpersuasive as a rebuttal to the development of the systems proposed.
Consider the alternative—and this is, I would suggest, a crucial perspective—of
cross-border relief being developed on a purely ad hoc basis, in other words
of a greater number of decisions by national courts that (without reasoned

138

See Austin, note 44 above.
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contemplation) affect conduct beyond their borders. Let us not be naive about
the choice: there is no idealized, ‘national’ world of hermetically sealed borders
within which national courts decide disputes without spillover effects. The choice
is between two scenarios, both of which involve a departure from a theorized
territorial model: (1) courts providing relief that extends their law beyond their
borders, but doing so without considering explicitly the external effects of their
application of local law or why to offer cross-border relief; and (2) the development of a system in which courts offer conscious explanations of why crossborder relief is appropriate and why the internal effects of one state outweigh the
external effects on another. It is, in effect, the difference between a systematic and
transparent development of these rules of international intellectual property law,
bounded by outside parameters established (whether through treaty or less formal adoption) by nation states, and a spate of competing decisions with universal
effects but unaccompanied by any effort at justifying or explaining the same.
Moreover, I am less troubled than others by the notion that we are moving in
some respects toward a different balance of universal and national values—though
the precise balance is a point of genuine debate. Proper respect for national
values, especially as long as national political structures remain the primary voice
for the expression of political viewpoints, is important. But the balance between
national and non-national sources of affinity is shifting; legal institutions that
reflect the impulses of the citizenry are more likely to endure than those which
resist or counter those impulses.139

B. Private Ordering
As the public international law-making process has reached impasse, other
institutions have stepped forward. As noted above, national (especially US) courts
have begun to offer interpretations of the scope of their national laws that
can easily extend their local norms into international space, particularly in the

139 See Dinwoodie, ‘A New Copyright Order’, note 12 above, 550–51. Having urged a realist
perspective on those who find these proposals unsettlingly close to the imposition of global values,
let me also suggest a reality check for those who seek to advance enlightened systems of so-called
‘public private international law’. It may be some time before judges in national courts can function
in ways that routinely defer to the application of foreign law. But there are signs of progress in
judicial awareness of the experience and decisions of other national courts. The increased specialization of the intellectual property judiciary may assist in developing this common knowledge (see
Dinwoodie, ‘Developing a Private International Law’, note 132 above), although specialized courts raise
a number of other issues that might caution against too ready an embrace of that concept. See
Rochelle C Dreyfuss, ‘The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts’ (1989) 64 NYU LR 1.
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online context.140 But when courts do so, at least nominally (if, to my mind,
inadequately), they consider the international implications of their decisions
under the rubric of private international law concerns of jurisdiction, applicable
law, recognition of judgments, and comity.
Other institutions have, however, begun to articulate and sub silentio develop
international copyright norms in ways that do not involve the conscious consideration of either the balance of copyright law or the additional concerns of
international copyright law. The remainder of this chapter discusses two such
examples, but first situates them within the broader context of private ordering
and copyright law.
Private Ordering and Copyright Law
Any rule of copyright law must encourage an optimal supply of knowledge in a
vast array of different social and economic settings: copyright law covers a wide
range of different works created and used in many different industries. Inevitably,
default rules of copyright law are a blunt (and, some would say, inefficient) instrument for achieving an optimal level of protection. By tailoring protection to
particular settings and enabling price discrimination, private ordering might
make the creation and distribution of knowledge more efficient.
Private ordering of the treatment of copyrighted works has occurred through the
use of both contract and technology. In the online context, contractual ordering
has primarily taken the form of click-wrap contracts. Technological measures
take private ordering further. Like click-wrap contracts, DRMs enable price
discrimination and tailored access rights. But, they also hold out the prospect
of self-enforcement and there is not even the nominal involvement of the user
in the negotiation of the terms of access.
Proponents of these forms of private ordering also claim efficiency gains that
implicate international copyright principles. Online delivery of works is almost
inevitably international in nature. Yet, the discordance between territorial
copyright laws and the ubiquity of the internet presents immense problems
of jurisdiction and applicable law which international copyright law has not yet
resolved. As discussed in Section A of this Part, developing a system of conflict

140 See Austin, note 44 above, 1183; Michael Geist, ‘Cyberlaw 2.0’ (2003) 44 BCL Rev 323,
323–358. The phenomenon is even more pronounced in trademark law. See, e.g. Heathmount, note
119 above (BNA); Sallen v. Corinthians, note 78 above; Harrods Ltd v 60 Internet Domain Names,
302 F3d 214 (4th Cir 2002); see generally Graeme B Dinwoodie, ‘The Extended Reach of the
ACPA: The Domination of Trademark Rights or the Domination of US Law’(24 April 2003) Paper
Presented to Eleventh Annual Fordham Conference on International Intellectual Property Law and
Policy, New York.
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rules for copyright law is on the agenda of several institutions, but a solution has
proved hard to find. In contrast, parties to a contract can agree to norms that are
limited to a particular nation state, or detached from any nation state (e.g. the
lex mercatoria applied by arbitrators in international commercial arbitration).
Technology, likewise, can be programmed to permit access that corresponds
to certain national norms, international norms or to no existing norms at all.
Both contract and technology are seen, therefore, as instruments for avoiding
not only the inefficiencies flowing from the bluntness of rules of copyright
law, but also the uncertainties that impede the generation and distribution of
knowledge in an international environment.
However, private ordering of the supply of knowledge through contract
and technology has tended to result in a balance of rights and obligations more
favourable to the content provider than would be the case under default rules
of national copyright law. Thus, persons disadvantaged by this shift might
be expected to argue for the overriding application of copyright norms, notwithstanding the efficiency benefits that are claimed for private ordering. Such
arguments can be grounded either in substantive concerns regarding the
appropriate balance of rights or in the uninclusive nature of the private ‘lawmaking process’.141 Copyright law is devised through a democratic process.
Notwithstanding public choice concerns that have made recent legislative
activity unattractive to some scholars, that process confers a degree of legitimacy
on the norms that are applied by courts. Private ordering lacks that form of
legitimacy. Instead, proponents of private ordering rest their claim of legitimacy
on its concordance with the parties’ wishes and on the nominally limited reach
of that ordering, namely, only as far as the parties to the transaction. Of course,
in practice many parties to transactions are powerless to influence the terms of
the deal. Moreover, such purportedly private activity (especially when replicated
in the mass market) impinges directly and indirectly upon non-parties to the
transaction (i.e. the public).
Private Ordering and the Creation of International Copyright Norms
Private ordering, therefore, clearly has costs and challenges to its displacement of
copyright norms may yet succeed.142 But in other online intellectual property

141 This may, but need not, be entirely grounded in efficiency. It is an open question whether
the efficiency gains of binding, technologically (largely) self-enforcing bargains outweighs the arguable efficiency costs of an unbalanced allocation of rights and privileges. But, even if there are efficiency gains, a variety of non-efficiency-grounded values might support trumping private ordering
(e.g. free speech, encouragement of heterodoxy, etc.).
142 Challenges to private ordering that ousts copyright norms have, however, been unsuccessful,
at least in the United States. The majority of challenges to click-wrap licenses (like challenges to
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contexts, private ordering has become the means of (at least, initially) overcoming the jurisdictional and enforcement issues presented by the ubiquity of the
internet. Most notable in this regard is the UDRP, adopted by ICANN in late
1999, which has become the international standard for resolving cybersquatting
disputes through a powerful cocktail of contract and technology. The UDRP
shows that private actors may create ‘international law’ with virtually as much
ease (and certainly as much effect) as nation states. The two examples discussed
below suggest equivalent potential in copyright law.
Notice and Take-Down Procedures
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (DMCA) introduced a set of
provisions, now found in section 512 of the Copyright Act 1976, which created
‘safe harbours’ for internet service providers alleged to have contributed to
copyright infringement by subscribers.143 Among these safe harbours is one
that enables an ISP to escape monetary relief for copyright infringement where
it has hosted a subscriber’s website containing infringing material, provided
that once the ISP receives a notice from a copyright owner reporting an
alleged infringement it expeditiously takes down the infringing material and
otherwise complies with the provisions of the notice and take-down procedure
in section 512.
Copyright owners are not obliged to use the notice and take-down procedures
to pursue infringers. If they so desire, copyright owners may simply bring an
infringement action against the user (and, contributorily, the ISP) under traditional principles of liability (which were not altered by the DMCA). But, because
the copyright owner may not know the user, and because the primary relief sought
(the removal of the infringing material) can be achieved more cheaply and more
quickly through the offices of the cooperating ISP than the offices of the courts,
copyright owners have readily turned to the notice and take-down procedure.

shrink-wrap licenses previously) have failed, and the contractual terms have been allowed to prevail.
See Mark A. Lemley, ‘Intellectual Property and Shrink-wrap Licenses’ (1996) 68 S Cal LR 1239,
1239–1240. There are exceptions, see. e.g. Step-Saver Data v Wyse Tec, 939 F2d 91 (3d Cir 1991),
and recent case law is mixed, but the trend is still toward enforcement. See Bowers v Baystate
Technologies, 230 F3d 1317 (Fed Cir 2003); Specht v Netscape Comms, 306F3d 14 (1st Cir 2001).
Most successful challenges have been grounded in contract doctrine, rather than insisting on the
supremacy of copyright norms. But see Vault Corp v Quaid Software, 847 F2d 255 (5th Cir 1988).
Similarly, arguments that the norms of copyright law should be elevated over technological measures
imposing restrictions inconsistent therewith have been rebuffed by the courts. See Universal City
Studios v Corley, 273 F3d 419 (2d Cir 2001).
143 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub L No 105–304, 112 Stat 2860 (1998); Copyright
Act, 1976 (17 USC 512).
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Likewise, ISPs are not obliged to comply with notices that they receive. ISPs
may take the position that their subscriber’s use is not infringing, or that they are
not contributorily liable. But the immunity offered cooperating ISPs by section
512 greatly incentivizes compliance; indeed, it incentivizes over-compliance
(and little independent analysis) by ISPs that are in receipt of notices from copyright owners.144 Indeed, that is the value of the procedure, both to the copyright
owner (who obtains complete cooperation) and the ISP (who is relieved of uncertainties over liability without any need to expend resources on making judgement
calls or monitoring subscribers). As a result, take-down normally occurs within
24 hours.145
Under the DCMA, ISPs in the United States have through their responses to
notices under section 512 effectively served as first-instance private adjudicators
of infringement disputes between copyright owners and users who post copyrighted content to websites.146 But they are adjudicators who largely do not adjudicate; instead they process and enforce claims without consideration of the
merits of the defendant’s arguments.
Of course, the take-down notice is not the sum of the section 512 procedure. In
theory, these disputes are designed to precede litigation and the parties involved
are always free to resort to judicial resolution. Thus, a subscriber who is informed
that its ISP has received a notice of alleged copyright infringement may serve the
ISP with a counter-notification contesting the claim of infringement. The statute
then incentivizes the ISP’s restoration of the allegedly infringing material by
granting the ISP immunity for complying with the restoration request (after
informing the copyright owner, who may then initiate litigation, which will stay
restoration). Practice under the statute, however, reveals that the overwhelming
144 See Rights Watch Report 5 (2003). The Rights Watch Report, which contemplated policies
to be adopted in the EU, suggests that although ISPs might be incentivized to have scant regard for
residential subscribers, that might not be true of a large corporation paying for dedicated hosting.
This might in fact exacerbate concerns about this form of norm development, but there has been no
evidence that ISPs operating under the DMCA have made this distinction. However, if they had, it
would be hard to detect, highlighting the need (discussed below) for transparency to be a guiding
principle of any public structuring.
145 Department of Trade and Industry, Combating Internet Copyright Crime (The Publisher’s
Association, London, 2003) 20–25 available at <http://www.publishers.org.uk/paweb/paweb.
nsf/pubframe!Open>.
146 See ‘Activist Network in New York City Evicted from Internet by Dow, Verio’, (23 December
2002), available at <http://slash.autonomedia.org/article.pl?sid=02/12/23/153204>. Of course
even in the offline context, different intermediaries (depending upon the type of work involved)
often limit access to allegedly infringing work after receiving notice from the copyright owner. But
in the online environment, ISPs become central actors in all copyright disputes, regardless of the
type of work involved, and are thus able to determine the online availability of a broad spectrum of
copyrighted works. The centrality of ISPs to the supply of knowledge online makes the ex ante structural incentives that will guide their conduct, and any ex post external checks, crucial.
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majority of disputes are resolved with no counter-notification and no judicial
intervention.147
The practices of ISPs are so central to the success of the notice and take-down
procedure that they clearly have the capacity to develop norms both as regards
the substantive scope of copyright protection, and with respect to the enforcement of copyrights. The discussion above suggests that these practices are likely,
because of incentives built into the DMCA, to shift the balance of rights toward
copyright owners. But the DMCA also contains provisions that are designed
to balance the incentives that it creates to favour the copyright owner in the
implementation of the notice and take-down procedure. In addition to ISP
immunity for restoring material when requested to do so by a properly-served
counter-notification, section 512 provides civil liability for knowing material
misrepresentations that cause unjustified removal of material (or unjustified
restoration). These causes of action, plus the various immunities created by the
statute, and an important provision that entitles copyright owners to obtain from
ISPs the identity of the ISP’s subscribers who are alleged to have engaged in
copyright infringement by subpoena and without court order, are different
elements148 of the ‘public structuring’ of private ordering.149
If the practices of ISPs were shown to be altering the scope of protection afforded
to copyright owners, what should policy makers do? Assuming that copyright
law embodies a balance more likely to produce an optimal knowledge supply,
policy makers would need to revise the elements of public structuring currently
found in the Copyright Act. The fact that some might describe ISP practices as
‘private’ transactions should be of no moment. Beyond the mythic qualities of the
distinction that this presupposes, the description of section 512 above highlights
that those practices are intensely structured and supported by public legislation,
the Copyright Act.150

147 See Steven J Metalitz, ‘Implementation of the DMCA: The Practical Experience’ (20 April 2001)
Working Paper, Ninth Annual Fordham Conference on International Intellectual Property Law and
Policy, 7; Combating Internet Copyright Crime, note 145 above, 45. Of course, it might be argued
that in most cases, the infringement is clear. See Shira Perlmutter, ‘Comments from SOFTIC
International Symposium’ (20–21 November 2001) Tokyo.
148 In order to make the notice and take-down procedure work efficiently, copyright owners also
need reliable Whois data. Again, the apparent private ordering of ISPs and copyright owners in fact
requires substantial public underpinning.
149 See Michael Warnecke, ‘DMCA’s False Notification Provision Gains Traction in Complaints,
Case Law’, 73 Pat Trade Cop J 332 (26 January 2007) (discussing district court decision in Online
Policy Group v Diebold, 337 F Supp 2d 1195 (ND Cal 2004), as well as more recent reported opinions and complaints filed).
150 See Radin and Wagner, note 6 above.
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For this to be achieved, however, the ISP practices have to be known. While the
DMCA contains many elements of public structuring that suggest an effort to
maintain a fair balance of rights, the practices that it engenders are not easily
accessible to the public. The Copyright Office maintains no relevant records and
does not monitor the notices.151 At present, the practices are being monitored by
non-governmental organizations and these forms of monitoring may ultimately
cause governmental action.152 But transparency is lacking.153 Efforts to replicate
or revise the notice and take-down procedure should tackle this important question, which will lend legitimacy to the procedures adopted. 154
ISP practices under the DMCA may also be giving rise to an international
copyright norm. At present, no multilateral treaty provisions expressly govern
ISP liability. The Diplomatic Conference of the WIPO Copyright Treaty in
1996 did not adopt any provision regulating service provider liability (though
countries did adopt an Agreed Statement accompanying Article 8, which required
states to offer copyright owners the exclusive right to make a work available to
the public, acknowledging that ‘the mere provision of physical facilities for
enabling or making a communication does not in itself amount to communication within the meaning of this Treaty or the Berne Convention’). Yet this is
a topic that cries out for international agreement, or cooperation.155 WIPO
has tried to encourage convergence of standards through workshops on ISP
liability156 and intellectual property owners in the United States have lobbied

See Combating Internet Copyright Crime, note 145 above, 20–25.
See ChillingEffects.org, <http://www.chillingeffects.org> (last visited 2003).
153 In this regard, although the UDRP system is lacking some of the structural design elements
that inject balance into the notice and take-down procedure, such as a cause of action where complainants are found to have engaged in reverse domain-name hijacking, the decisions of panellists
are all public. This has enabled intense scrutiny, and has validated concerns that certain structural
elements skew the system (such as the choice of dispute-settlement provider being reserved exclusively to the trademark owner).
154 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal
Market, OJ L 178, 1. Although the EU Directive was adopted seven years ago, many Member States
of the European Union are still considering how best to implement a similar notice and take-down
system. Art 14 of the E-Commerce Directive obliged member states to enact an immunity from liability similar to section 512, but contained significantly less detail. The recitals to the Directive
instruct member states to encourage the development of a notice and take-down system by means
of ‘voluntary agreement between all parties concerned’, Recitals 40–46. In constructing and revising
these agreements, member states should be alert not only to the elements of public structuring in
section 512, but also to the demand for transparency. Law making by private agreements always
raises concerns of voice and legitimacy. This is particularly likely to be so where there is no mechanism to publicize or monitor the application of these rules. The EU ‘voluntary agreements’ must take
these transparency concerns into account, because the directive itself makes no such provision.
155 See Perlmutter, ‘Comments from SOFTIC International Symposium’, note 147 above.
156 See WIPO Workshop on Service Provider Liability (1 December 1999) Geneva, available at
<http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/1999/osp/pdf/osp_lia1.pdf>.
151
152
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hard (directly, and by asking the United States government to make provision for
DMCA replication in bilateral trade agreements) for other countries to adopt the
DMCA model.157
And, in fact, ISP practices under the DMCA are coming to establish the international norm. US copyright owners are serving notices on ISPs worldwide under
section 512158 and receiving surprisingly high levels of compliance.159 To be sure,
discrete (though similar) practices continue to evolve in other countries, and
this is not the first occasion when the law of a single country has purported
to have broad territorial reach. As noted above, although national courts nominally apply their intellectual property laws territorially, US courts have applied
their copyright and trademark law in a fashion that has arguably made US law
the dominant law online. But, there, the extended reach of US law has occurred
through its public application by courts, nominally restrained by rules of
private international law, a context that is both apparent and subject to contest
by courts of other countries. As those rules codify, through the public debate
that the decisions themselves generate, one would expect a more diverse range of
prescriptive influences.
ISP practices under the DMCA might, in addition, shift the balance between
the application of national and international rules, a shift which is itself construction of a new international copyright norm. As noted above, an implicit
element in every aspect of the international copyright regime is the allocation
of prescriptive authority to national or international institutions. Where this
balance is adjusted via ISP practices, however, the allocation between national
and international sources will likely not occur through a conscious decision
that for reasons of efficiency, already existing harmonization, or the maintenance
of divergent and fundamental national values, certain values require to be set
at one level or the other. Instead, this allocation might be the product of such
serendipitous forces as the governance structure of multinational ISPs, or
the market for ISP services (itself potentially the subject of regulation), or the
geographic composition of an ISP’s subscribers (which may be affected by any
number of variables).
Alternatively, and still speculatively, the balance of national and international
norms could be altered by a contractually grounded extension of the UDRP
model into the copyright realm. If ISPs acquire customers from several different
countries, ISPs might wish to establish a single policy for responding to alleged

157
158
159

See Combating Internet Copyright Crime, note 145 above, 20–25.
Metalitz, note 147 above, 8; Combating Internet Copyright Crime, note 145 above, 45.
Geist, note 140 above, 377.
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acts of copyright infringement. Indeed, because ISPs may (acting collectively)
offer a choke point not unlike that made available in the domain name context
by ICANN’s control of the root server, one might envision a system that sought
to expose a larger number of these copyright complaints to the light of day and
provide some form of adjudication of their merits. An ISP could contractually
require subscribers to submit to dispute settlement of infringement claims by
third-party copyright owners with respect to postings of copyrighted materials
on the ISP’s servers. The dispute-settlement providers, like the panellists in the
UDRP context, could be authorized to apply some designated body of rules, be
they national or international copyright laws or some hybrid, to determine
whether the ISP must remove such allegedly infringing materials.
In such an event, the rules applicable to notice and take-down disputes may well
evolve away from purely national roots toward contract-enshrined norms and
practices not tied to any particular prescriptive authority. Such rules might evolve
quite independently of the norms of any particular nation state. If such a system
were to develop,160 it would even more directly raise the challenges of private
ordering: rights of users coercively (though, nominally, contractually) subjected
to adjudication before fora of private adjudication.161
Whether non-national or international norms develop by dint of practice or
through a contractually constructed system, it is important to remember the
role of public structuring. This is not to deny the benefits of dynamic, nonnational specific standards that such a system might embody, or the efficiency
gains that are generated by fast processing of routine complaints. Rather, for
the benefits of these rules not to be outweighed by corresponding costs, any
procedural mechanism that is established must address, not only the substance
of the norms, but the structural incentives for their application in one direction
or another, and the publicizing of the practices in ways that facilitate active
national legislative or judicial involvement if that is appropriate. Moreover, there
must be a public-oriented input towards the allocation of certain issues to the
national, and other issues to the international, realm.

160 Copyright owners are content with the current system and would be unlikely to agree to any
such experiment, which they would view as unnecessary and blind to the benefits of an automatic
process that deals quickly and cheaply with routine cases of piracy. Moreover, they would argue,
users already have the capacity to force content owners to court in order to vindicate their claim.
These arguments are most easily rebutted, of course, if over-reaching by copyright owners is shown.
161 As in the case of the UDRP, one could not imagine national courts deferring to such decisions
simply because they are the product of institutions established by private arrangement and ‘affect
only’ those private parties.

108

02-Gervais-Chap02.indd 108

9/11/07 5:20:20 PM

B. Private Ordering
Agreements contemplated by Article 6(4) of the EU Copyright Directive
The EU E-Commerce Directive contemplates agreements among ISPs,
content-providers and users regarding notice and take-down procedures.162
But, while that directive contains no mandatory administrative review of those
agreements, the EU Copyright Directive goes further (procedurally, if not
substantively) in acknowledging that private ordering should, to some extent,
be subject to publicly-defined limits. The Directive (in Article 6) implements
Articles 11 and 12 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, which obliged signatory
countries to protect effective technological measures (i.e. DRMs) against unauthorized circumvention. (The treaties still left national law much room for experimentation.)163 Like the DMCA, the Copyright Directive validates DRMs as a
form of private ordering. Like ISP practices in response to notices from copyright
owners, technology need not be nationally configured. Technology is not inherently territorial, and thus to the extent that national laws validate DRMs that are
not tied to national copyright rules, they may be validating international norms
(if the DRMs are replicated by content owners generally). Indeed, it may add
expense to make the terms of use or access country-specific (but enable greater
price discrimination).
Alternatively, geographically-oriented technological measures have the capability to re-territorialize international knowledge markets in ways that bring
product distribution back to the historical premises of international copyright
law, rather than reconfigure copyright norms to the basis of contemporary
product distribution. Region-coding of DVDs exemplifies this option.164 Thus,
decisions made in the construction of DRMs by content owners may determine
whether norms of access to works are set nationally or internationally. And,
as suggested above, they have the capacity to set norms without reference to the
balance of rights established in copyright law (whether national or international).
Private ordering thus, once more, can affect the structural norms of international
copyright law: according to which set of values will the decision whether to
universalize or territorialize be made?

162 E-Commerce Directive, note 154 above, 12–13. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright
and related rights in the information society, OJ 22 June 2001 at 10 (L167) (Copyright Directive).
163 Samuelson, note 53 above, 530–533.
164 In an early draft of the Finnish implementation of the Copyright Directive, region-coding of
DVDs was expressly excluded from the definition of ‘technological measure’, thus enabling the sale
of devices that circumvent region-coding. But see Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment
Inc v Gaynor David Ball [2004] EWHC 1738 (Ch) (UK). Region-coding clearly limits the ability of
the technological protection measure to establish international norms.
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This discussion, of course, assumes wholesale validation of private ordering.
But the legislative inclination, thus far, does appear to be in favour of DRMs
effecting norms regarding the distribution of knowledge, whether inconsistent with national copyright law (though some limited exemptions patrol that
boundary), and whether inconsistent with international copyright norms
(concerning which no legislative intent can be discerned).
The EU recognized the potential problem of unbalanced private ordering and
the possibility that an unduly strict application of the new quasi-copyright
prohibition might have the effect of denying users the right to engage in acts
that would otherwise be permitted by copyright law. To redress any imbalance,
Article 6(4) of the Copyright Directive relies in the first instance on ‘voluntary
measures taken by the right-holders, including agreements between right-holders
and other parties concerned’ to ensure that those benefiting from exceptions are
able to exercise those exceptions.165 Thus, it seeks to ensure that certain166 copyright values will be preserved notwithstanding technological protection measures
inconsistent therewith.167
Moreover, if such measures are not taken voluntarily, Article 6(4) of the Directive
provides that ‘Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that

165 See Art 6(4). The only type of ‘voluntary measure’ expressly referenced in Art 6(4) is ‘agreements between right holders and other parties concerned’. But reaching such agreements will be a
difficult task. As the range of stakeholders with interests implicated by copyright law expands, reaching consensus becomes difficult (even assuming you can identify the stakeholders). Indeed, because
some of the exceptions at issue are linked to certain types of use and not defined categories of users
(i.e. are purpose exceptions, not identity exceptions), the beneficiaries may be quite diverse. Thus to
the extent that private contractual arrangements among interested parties will be the means by
which the ability to take advantage of copyright exceptions is guaranteed, there will likely have to
be a complex web of agreements. Of course, agreements are not the exclusive form of ‘voluntary
measure’, so rights holders might also consider modification of technological measures in ways that
enable beneficiaries to take advantage of the exceptions in question.
166 Art 6(4) only applies to certain stated exceptions, and only in so far as those exceptions are
recognized in the national copyright law in question. See Jerome H Reichman, Graeme B Dinwoodie
and Pamela Samuelson, ‘A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of
Technically Protected Copyrighted Works’ (2007) 22 Berk Tech LJ (forthcoming).
167 The Copyright Directive also regulates the relationship between compensation rights of
authors under ‘private copying’ schemes in national copyright laws, and the use of technological
protection measures. Art 5 provides that the appropriate rate of return for authors under such compensation schemes should take into account the extent to which technological protection measures
have been deployed. Indeed, a recital to the directive contemplates that the compensation under the
copyright scheme might be reduced to zero where technological protection measures enable the
author to obtain payment. But this provision regulates the technological protection measures only
minimally: it does not make the copyright norm prevail but rather, simply ensures that the public
system does not duplicate payments already extracted by private ordering. The payment extracted
by private ordering may, however, exceed the payment that would have been available under the
public system. Thus, as discussed below, Art 6(4) may be closer to a mechanism that ensures the predominance of the default norms of copyright law.
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right-holders make available to the beneficiary […] the means of benefiting
from’ certain exceptions and limitations to copyright.168 Thus, unlike the agreements contemplated by the E-Commerce Directive, here there is a shadow in
which the bargaining will take place. Substantively, it is a narrow shadow: only
a very few exceptions and limitations are listed (and this is a major failing as a
public structuring control element). But procedurally, it presents great latitude to
member states.
What appropriate measures might member states adopt under Article 6(4)?
Different member states are experimenting with different mechanisms. These
differ in several respects, but most importantly, they vary in terms of institutional
allocation of authority among courts, magistrates, and the administrative and
legislative branches.169 If these differences persist, then we may be presented with
a series of experiments in how best to control and monitor private ordering in
ways that preserve the benefit of DRMs without conceding control on the important public question of how to ensure a balance of rights between copyright owners and users.
If the inconsistency of DRMs with national copyright law is resolved by initial
agreement between rights holders and the beneficiaries of exemptions, there is
a possibility that the DRMs might seek to impose the same technological protection measures on products distributed internationally, raising the prospect
that the DRMs (as modified by agreements between interested parties) will come
to create international norms.170 This is likely, at least within the European
Union. Whether such norm creation by a mix of technology and contract should
have a broader geographical remit should ideally be determined by the set of
structural international copyright norms that guided the historical balance
(contemporarily interpreted) between national autonomy and universality.
More likely, it will be determined by whether, within industry groups, there is

168 The German implementation of the Copyright Directive contains an interesting provision
that reflects comments above regarding transparency. Private ordering proponents frequently assert
that any imbalance that occurs can be corrected by the competitive market; consumers will not
buy goods protected by oppressive DRMs. But the market is constructed on massive information
asymmetry. Germany proposes to partially correct that asymmetry by public regulation, namely, by
requiring any work protected by DRM to be labelled in a fashion that discloses the restrictions on its
use. See Foundation for Information Policy Research, ‘Implementing the EU Copyright Directive’
(September 2003) Cambridge. Recent attacks on over-protective DRM systems in a number of
European countries (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands, France, Finland and Norway) have relied on
consumer protection or unfair competition law. See David Ibson, ‘Norway declares Apple’s iTunes
Illegal,’ Financial Times, 24 January 2007.
169 See Foundation for Information Policy Research, ibid; Urs Gasser and Silke Ernst, Best
Practice Guide: Implementing the EU Copyright Directive in a Digital Age (2006).
170 If ensuring compliance with exceptions available under national law falls to the safeguard mechanisms contemplated by Art 6(4), it is more likely that any solution will be tied to national norms.
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the political will to extend any agreement reached within the European Union
to the United States and elsewhere. Article 6(4) is a creditable (if overly limited
and undefined) effort at imposing public checks on private ordering. But the
values of the international copyright system, with their attendant affects on
the generation and distribution of knowledge, are noticeably absent.
The Role for Public Structuring and International Norms
As both of these examples demonstrate, private ordering has (as its proponents
have argued) substantial ability to overcome the persistent problem of territorial
rights in a less than fully territorial world. Yet both are ultimately dependent
upon an underpinning of public regulation, even if that regulation consists of a
decision to forbear from acting. The mix of public structuring that will be essential to buttress effective private ordering will vary from one context to another. In
some, it will be forbearance from intrusive regulation; in others it will be laws
supplying the instruments (e.g. subpoena power to obtain information about
alleged infringers) by which parties are able to engage in efficacious private ordering; and in yet others, it will consist in a set of related liabilities (or immunity
therefrom) that incentivize private conduct.
It is clear that private ordering is dependent upon public structuring for its effectiveness. The central political question, however, that is essential to the legitimacy
of publicly-structured private ordering, is whether the forms of structuring
are sufficiently balanced to ensure that—when implemented through private
ordering—the outcomes produce a balance of rights and access that furthers
the optimal supply of knowledge. For those who are sceptical of the wholly ‘private’ nature of any social activity, it is not difficult to justify conscious political
choices surrounding the nature of the public structuring. But even for those
who attach the (‘do not disturb’) label of ‘private’ to what ISPs do in response to
notices from copyright owners, or what content owners do in implementing
DRMs, it is surely evident that their favoured system is heavily dependent upon
public structuring, and thus not immune from the public oversight that is
appropriate in return for public support.171

171 In offline contexts, rarely was the availability of content of all types at the mercy of a
single group of technological providers. Certainly, distribution channels for particular types
of works contained dominant market players; the mass availability of hard copy books offline is
increasingly (in the United States) a function of the proximity of Barnes & Noble and Borders. And,
the availability of performance licenses for musical works was heavily dependent upon the practices
of ASCAP and BMI. But these institutions acted subject to legal restraints (e.g. antitrust laws) rather
than under the protection of legal immunities. This is public structuring in the offline world that
was effective, and important. If copyright owners asserted egregious over-reaching, possible causes
of action did exist (whether constructed creatively or expressly sanctioned, as is the case in the UK).
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Even with conscious attention to the nature of that public structuring, because
some of the ways that the private ordering will play out will likely flow from such
unpredictable forces as the organizational structure of firms and inter-industry
political bargains, it will be important for public structuring to be prospective
and dynamic (no less than copyright law itself must be able to react to change).
The provisions in Article 6(4) of the EU Copyright Directive, if expanded in
scope, appear to possess that potential, even if in the Directive they assume only
abstract and muzzled form. And, for such assessment to be made on an ongoing
basis, whatever private ordering occurs must be subjected to the light of day. This
can be done by non-governmental organizations, but more importantly such
transparency must itself be built into the public structuring of the private system.
If open government is a mantra of liberal democratic polities, then transparent
private ordering must equally be the obligation of those who purport (beneficently) to arrive at the same results through private governance.
Finally, each of these forms of private ordering has the potential to create international norms, both substantively and structurally in the allocation of certain
norms to the national or international level. Yet, no public structuring that currently exists holds private law makers to account for their decision to alter the
balance of national autonomy and universal rules. International copyright law
embodies important structural, or institutional, norms that impinge directly
upon the generation and distribution of knowledge: national autonomy, diversity of values, and resistance to orthodoxy, are all valuables tools in optimizing the
knowledge supply. Public structuring that fails to account for these international
values has failed to account for an important part of a system that purports positively to affect the creation and availability of knowledge.

Conclusion
The international intellectual property system has always been driven, to some
extent, by trade concerns. However, the recent incorporation of intellectual
property within the apparatus of the World Trade Organization, along with other
social and economic developments, has caused the rapid evolution of the
international intellectual property system. The contours of that system are now
quite different than when the system first took shape in the late nineteenth
century. Yet, appreciating the important role of trade institutions in changing the

See Paul Heald, ‘Payment Demands for Spurious Copyrights: Four Causes of Action’ (1994)
I J Intell Prop L 259.
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intellectual property system should not distract commentators from other developments that are now effecting the creation of international intellectual property
norms equally. In particular, private ordering activities have the capacity to regulate extensive international activity, and to do so without full public scrutiny.
Thus, these activities also must be scrutinized, with a view to both how they affect
the balance of rights between right holders and users, and how they affect the balance between national and international regulation.
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